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CHAPTER I 
Materials and Methods for a Grassroots Study of Populism 
in lllinois 
The Populist Party was, in many respects, the most successful 
third party in American histocy. Populist efforts in the election of 1892 
climaxed nearly a quarter century of agrarian unrest and marked the 
culmination of agitation by farm organizations demanding sweeping social, 
economic, and political reforms. For these reasons, and because Populism 
was representative of a general social upheaval during the late nineteenth 
century, the movement has attracted attention from several prominent 
scholars and from countless lesser figures • . John D. Hick's seminal work 
The Populist Revolt, written in 1931, is perhaps the best known survey. 
effort. However, more recent works such as Norman Pollack's The 
Populist Response to Industrial American (New York, 1962) and Walter T .  K. 
Nugent's The Tolerant Populists, Kansas Populism and Nativism (Chicago, 
1963) although more specialized, are also acclaimed as significant studies. 
Although not dealing exclusively with Populism, C. Vann Woodward, 
Richard Hofstadter, Chester McArthur Destler, and more recently Paul 
Kleppner, have produced books attracting considerable notice. Older, 
1 
• 
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narrower, but well-known research by Hicks and by Hallie Farmer has been 
widely read and frequently cited. 1 
Yet while these works are not by any means over-rated, and while 
they certainly deserve the reputation they enjoy, a great void exists in 
Populist historiography. Most existing works on Populism might be called 
"macro-studies . "  They examine the movement as a social and economic 
phenomenon with political manifestations on state and national levels. Other 
studies deal with relationships between the Populists and economic institutions 
such as the railroads or labor unions, or with the effects of physical condi-
tions like soil type, rainfall, and agricultural production on agrarian dis-
content. The great oversight in traditional Populist historiography has been 
a widespread neglect of the movement on a grassroots level. 
A general trend toward "history from the bottom up" has recently 
developed in American historical writing. Works written in such a vein 
usually deal with a variety of local, social, economic, and political conditions. 
The basic theory behind such research is that it can uncover at least as much 
truth about American development as can studies of state or national leaders 
and their handiwork. 2 Furthermore, when speaking of social or economic 
1 .  The works referred to are: C. Vann Woodward, Tom Watson: Agrarian 
Rebel (New York, 1 938), and Origins of the New South (Baton Rouge. 1951); 
Richard Hofstadter. Age of Reform, From Bryan to F. D . R .  (New York, 1955); 
Chester McArthur Destler, American Radicalism, 1865-1901 (New London, 
1946); Paul Kleppner, The Cross of Culture: A Social Analysis of Midwestern 
Politics, 1850-1900 (New York, 1970); The journal articles by Hicks and 
Farmer are noted in the bibliography of this paper. 
2. For example, although this work is unrelated to this study, Stephen 
Thernstrom in Poverty and Progress: Social Mobility in a Nineteenth Century City: 
history especially, it i s  doubtful that any composite national American 
development exists. Social and economic trends vary, if only by degree, 
from place to place across the nation. However, grassroots research 
has provided some interesting insights about typical segments of American 
society. 
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One o f  the motives behind this study is to provide a start toward writing 
the history of the Populist Movement in Illinois "from the bottom up. " Its 
focus will be both economic and demographic, comparing areas which showed 
significant Populist strength in the election of 1892 to one another and to 
areas which did not show such strength. 
The Populists did not win i n  any Ulinois counties in 1892 and, according 
to existing records, carried townships in only three counties--Pike County, 
on the Mississippi River north of St. Louis; Shelby County, in the east 
central section of the state; and Marion County, in the heart of southern 
Ulinois. 3 Sufficient tax records do not exist in Shelby County to carry out 
the kind of grassroots analysis this study undertakes. However, ample source 
material i s  available for Marion and Pike counties. 4 In addition to tax records, 
discovered that for Newberryport, Connecticut� at least, social mobility among 
the laboring class was nonexistant. Even intergenerational mobility was slight. 
Thernstrom 's evidence seems to indicate that the Horatio Alger image of 
opportunity in mid-nineteenth century America has little if any veracity. Since 
Thernstrom's pioneering effort other historians, mainly studying urban 
America, have utilized similar approaches to their topics. 
3 .  The state total for Illinois, and a breakdown of the returns by counties, 
for 1892, i s  found i n  a document compiled by the Illinois Secretary of State, 
Official Vote o f  the State of Illinois Cast at the General Election Held November 8, 
1892 {Springfield, Ill.: H. W. Rokker, State Printer and Bindel}, pp. 1-2. 
4. Both tax assessors' books and tax collectors' books exist for most 
townships in Marion and Pike counties in 1892. However only collectors' books 
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this study relies upon newspapers for the counties being examined, census 
tabulations for 1870 through 1890, the original population schedules for the 
Tenth Census, county atlases and plat books, county directories, and county 
histories--plus, of course, numerous secondary sources. 
Several obstacles, some major and some minor, were encountered in 
the course of this research. Compiling and tabulating raw data from county 
materials was a difficult and challenging operation. Tax records proved 
notoriously inaccurate. Assessors' computations were sometimes erroneous 
and illustrated a high level of arithmetic incompetence. But spelling was 
worse and presented even greater problems.  Mistakes in  assessors' tab-
ulations were relatively easy to spot and correct. However, spelling errors 
involved judgements on whether two names were, in reality, one person. If 
a man owned real estate in several different sections of a township, his name 
might be spelled differently each time it was listed in the tax book. Further-
more, even if a surname was spelled consistantly throughout the book, the 
first name was often in so many forms that the tabulation of data was some-
, 
what speculative. For example, the tax on a tract of land might be assessed 
to James W. Nelson. Subsequent assessments on other property might be 
assigned to James Nelson and to J. W.  Nelson. Were these three names one 
survived in Shelby County, the third candidate for study. Collectors' books 
show only the amount of tax assessed and paid, and do not divide real estate 
holdings into improved and unimproved acreage as assessors' books do. 
Neither do collectors' books categorize personal property holdings. Thus 
very little worthwhile analysis can be conducted from them, and, for this 
reason, it was decided to bypass a township study in Shelby County. 
individual owning several pieces of real estate, or were they more than one 
person, perhaps relatives of the first? Sometimes personal property 
listings at the end of the assessor's book, and township plats, if they were 
drawn around 1892, were helpful in making such judgements. 
5 
Another probl.em related to the use of tax records was that residents 
reporting no personal property holdings were not on the townships' personal 
property tax lists. This omission meant a tenant farmer with no personal 
property, such as household furnishings, livestock, or agricultural implements-­
items which might conceivably be furnished by the landlord--would appear 
nowhere on the tax rolls. On the other hand a man owning and farming a 
small piece of land yet so poor he had no personal property to rep ort, would 
appear to be a non-resident landowner. Therefore, no way exists to deter-
mine the exact number of residents, and henc.e, the total adult male population-­
the number of potential voters--in each township. If manuscripts for the 
Eleventh Census were available, an exact figure could be easily established. 
Unfortunately the original schedules for the Eleventh Census were almost 
totally destroyed by fire and are not on microfilm. Furthermore, schedules 
of the Twelfth Census (1900), supposed to be released in the spring of 1971, 
are still unavailable. The only source of raw demographic data is the Tenth 
Census, taken in 1880. Since this material is separated by twelve years from 
the period being studied, the research situation is less than ideal. However, 
it is doubtful that any ideal situation exists. Scholars are often plagued with 
inadequacies in their source materiials--lapses in data, inac�uracy of data, 
6 
and conflicting information from different sources, to name a few of the more 
common problems. If historians are to produce any scholarship, they must 
not let these obstacles overwhelm them. They must use what they have, 
and try to make the best of it. 
Fortunately, detailed, multi-volume compllations of the Tenth, Eleventh, 
and Twelfth Censuses are extant. These resources provide a variety of 
demographic data. Some of the available statistics useful to this study 
include: age distribution of male residents, by counties; population by race 
and sex, by counties; number and nativity of foreign born, by counties; and 
population by minor civil divisions. This material, used in addition to the 
demographic data present in the tax books, and from the microfilm census 
schedules for 1880, provide enough evidence to facilitate reasonably accurate 
estimates about the size and characteristics of the electorate in the areas under 
examination. The tax records and the census volumes on agriculture, and on 
wealth, debt, and taxation provide a source of data useful for the economic 
analysis in this study. 
Selecting the areas for examination was a two step process. Since the 
ultimate goal of this procedure was to uncover instances of Populist strength 
at the township level, search methods were aimed at minimizing its difficulty. 
The only available source of township election returns are 1892 newspapers, 
one for each county. However examining the election returns for every county 
would be a time-consuming process·with a relatively small reward. Thus the 
first step was to identify those counties where the Peoples Party experienced 
7 
some degree of success. In twelve counties, mostly in southern Illinois, the 
Populists polled over ten percent of the presidential votes--the figure arbitrarily 
established as the minimum boundary for counties to be further investigated. 
However, 1892 newspapers no longer exist for five of these twelve counties, and 
in four more the election summaries show only a strong widespread level of 
political discontent, but no township falling into the Populist column--leaving 
three counties with potential for grassroots analysis. 5 
The townships studied in Marion and Pike counties were chosen according 
to the degrees of political partisanship they exhibited. All townships were 
studied where the Populist national ticket received more votes than the 
presidential candidates of both major parties. Any township where the Populists 
outpolled one of the major parties afoo was subjected to analysis. As a control, 
the two townships in each county where the Republicans and Democrats achieved 
their largest percentages also were included. Thus, in a sense, the "most" 
Populist, "most" Democratic, and ''most" Republican townships were studied. 
Also included were townships which did not meet any of the above criteria, but 
where voting pattern were interesting--such as in one Marion County township 
which the Democrats carried but where the Populists came within three votes 
of equaling the Republican total. 
In all, twelve townships were analyzed in this study. Several economic 
and demographic variables were examined to determine just what possible 
5. William E. Keller, ed. , Newspapers in the Illinois State Historical 
Library (Springfield, Ill. : Illinois State Historical Library, n. d .  ).  News­
papers covering the 1892 election do not exist.for 30 of Illinois' 102 counties. 
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relationship they had, if any, to Populism in 1892. Some of the factors 
considered were: degree of land improv�ment and mechanization of agri­
culture, land value, rate of tenancy versus land ownership, and population 
variables. These factors were not only examined for 1892 but changes in 
them over time were measured. Furthermore, since most probably no 
single factor explains the incidence of Populism in those townships, variables 
which seemed to be related were compared to one another. 
Two additional things would have been helpful to this study--a computer 
and a knowledge of the statistical techniques to make it useful. While the 
methodological level of this work is not quantitatively sophisticated, it improved 
a s  time passed. However lack of technical knowledge and the lack of a computer 
prevented simultaneous consideration of more than two variables when more than 
two factors may have worked together to promote agrarian discontent. Multi­
variate analysis may be needed to explain the existance of Populist enclaves. 
Chapter Two of this study is a brief survey of the national Populist 
movement. Chapter Three deals with agrarian discontent in Illinois. The 
fourth chapter analyzes counties showing some degree of Populist strength. 
The two following chapters descend to the township level. C hapter Seven assesses 
the demographic factors rela ted to voting behavior, and the final chapter provides 
an overview and reassessment of the Populist movement in Illinois. 
CHAPTER II 
From Bacon to Bryan: A Brief Survey of Agrarian Discontent 
Agriculture is America's oldest and in many ways her most honored 
occupation. Few important figures in American history have denounced the 
farmer, nor have they repudiated his role as a pillar in the economic structure 
of this nation. For a great many years during the early history of the United 
States, agriculture was the foundation of the American economy, and farmers 
were collectively accorded a degree of respect by many persons who accepted 
Thomas Jefferson's admiration for the yoeman farmer as the example of frugality, 
industry, and purity. Yet farmers themselves have seldom attached much 
significance to their laudation, emphasizing instead what they perceive to be an 
economic condition less than commensurate with their supposed importance to 
the health and well-being of the nation. 
Agrarian discontent in the United States is almost as old as American 
agriculture. Major rural uprisings date back to 1676 when Nathaniel Bacon led 
a thousand back-country pioneers against the government of colonial Virginia.  
A century later, in  1786, Captain Daniel Shays led a band of impoverished 
western Massachusetts farmers against the state government and the "mo�ey 
power. " In 1794, the farmers of western Pennsylvania, motivated by similar 
economic concerns, defied the newly created federal government and were 
crushed by an overwhelming army of 13, 000 men. 
9 
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Rural politics in the nineteenth century, while generally less violent, 
was much more influential to American history. Land hunger, coming chiefly 
from the western United States,· was a major factor driving America to war in 
1812 and again in 1846. Although some scholars are beginning to question the 
role rural America played in the election of Andrew Jackson in 1828, most 
historians still agree the farm vote was a major factor in creating a new era in 
American politics. 
After the Civil War, agrarian discontent once again played an important 
role in shaping America. Farm organizations like the Patrons of Husbandry · 
and the Farmers' Alliances on occasion worked for economic reforms and for 
controls on Big Business. The Grangers, for example, successfully agitated 
during the 1870's and 1880's for passage of legislation aimed at regulating the 
railroads--legislation which ultimately led to creation of the Interstate Commerce 
Commission (ICC). Post-Civil War farmers also played an active ·roll in the 
political process. Both the Greenback Party and the Populist Party were 
primarily agrarian movements. While by no means successful political organ­
izations, these parties could claim some accomplishments. The Populists,: in 
particular, were the most successful third party in American history, electing 
several western governors, senators, and congressmen in 1892 and 1894. 
Although the �opulists did not accomplish their- long range goals, they did help 
bring about a major redirection within the Democratic Party in 1896. 
At the end of the American Revolution, Jefferson expressed the hope that 
the nation would always be dominated by agriculture, qepending on Europe for 
11 
manufactured products. In antebellum America it seemed that Jefferson's 
hopes would be realized, as the agricultural frontier moved westi.vard. � In 
the 1850's farmers poured out of the Ohio Valley into the sparsely settled areas 
west of the Mississippi River. During the decade before the Civil War, the 
population of Minnesota multiplied by twenty-nine. The population of Missouri 
doubled, and in Iowa it tripled, while in Nebraska, Kansas and Dakota territories 
grew from almost nothing to 107, 000, 29, 000 and 5, 000 respectively. 1 · But 
by 1850, American industry had already challenged agriculture and by 1900, 
the farmer was of only secondary importance to the nation�s economy. Census 
figures for 1860 indicate that three fifths of the persons in the United States lived 
on farms. By 1900, this figure declined to one third, However, it would be 
erroneous to conclude farming was a dying way of life after the Civil War. Even 
though the weight of population distribution shifted against agriculture, the total 
farm population continued to climb between 1870 and 1900; the most striking 
2 
growth again occurred in the trans-Mississippi West. Thus, while the agrarian 
population did not grow nearly as fast as urban America and while E astern agri-
culture was on a slow general decline, the rapid settlement of new territory and 
improved farming methods continued to make rural areas a vital part of American 
life. 
The agricultural boom which swept the trans-Mississippi West after the 
Civil War resulted from two main factors, railroads and cheap land. The opening 
1 .  Fred A. Shannon, The Farmers' Last Frontier: Agriculture, 
1860-1897 (New York: Harper and Row, 1945), p. 33. 
2. Ibid, pp. 349-52. 
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of this vast unsettled expanse of Western land was itself closely related to 
railroad development of the area. Although the idea of railroads in the West 
was an old one, the Civil War delayed implementation of any specific construction 
plans. After the war, western railroads were constructed with government 
assistance, either by cash grants or by gifts of land--alternating sections along 
the railroads' right-of-way which it sold to settlers to repay construction costs. 
Both the railroads and territorial or state legislatures encouraged 
settlement and attempted to destroy myths which had created an unfavorable 
image of the West as the Great American Desert. Each western state had an 
immigratinn board, and many counties employed immigration commissioners. 
Towns and cities through chambers of commerce, real estate boards, and other 
similar organizations industriously presented the claims of their localities. They 
published pamphlets in a variety of languages and distributed them throughout 
the United States and in Europe. They encouraged foreign immigration and in 
the 1870's eastern depressions speeded the rate at which the discontented 
moved westward, lured by the propaganda of railroad agents and other western 
3 boosters. 
Perhaps a bigger lure than conditions in the East or in Europe was the 
availability of western land. Railroads purposely kept land prices low, 
preferring to make their money from business the settlers would give them, 
3 .  Solon Justus Buck, The Granger Movement, A Study of Agricultural 
Organization and Its Political, Economic, and Social Manifestations, 1870-1880, 
Bison Books (Lincoln, Neb. : University of Nebraska Press, 1969), p. 5, and 
Hallie Farmer, "The Economic Background of Frontier Populism," Mississippi 
Valley Historical Review, X (March, 1924), pp. 406, 409. 
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rather than from the sale of land to those settlers. Railroads reasoned that 
low land prices would speed settlement.and would be more beneficial in the 
long run. Furthermore, not only were railroad land prices low, terms were 
easy. The Kansas Pacific, for example, refunded a percentage of passage 
money to immigrants who purchased land. The Union Pacific offered credit. 
Settlers paid one-tenth of the total price at the time of sale, but the rest could 
be deferred over eleven years at seven percent interest. However, for the first 
three years, only the interest had to be paid. If the buyer purchased his land 
over a shorter period, a reduction was made in the price. Much cheaper 
public land was also available under the Homestead Act, Preemption Act, and 
Timber Culture Act, although once the railroads came through, it did not last 
long, except in the arid western plains regions. Even so, between 1860 and 
1900 about 400, 000 families got such land and kept it for themselves. 4 
As public land vanished, and as railroad land fell into the hands of 
speculators, a boom developed. Increasing prosperity in the West caused 
capital to move in that direction. Good crop yields a�d high prices encouraged 
many Easterners to invest their money in western mortgages. Furthermore, 
as cheap la�d became more scarce, the need for borrowed money became 
greater. Interest rates were attractive to the potential investor, ranging from 
six to ten percent on real estate and from ten to eighteen percent on chattel 
4. Shannon, Farmers' Last Frontier, p. 55, Farm�r, ''Background of 
Frontier Populism," p. 407, and John D. Hicks, The Populist Revolt, A History 
of the Farmers' Alliance and the People's Party, Bison Books (Lincoln, Neb. : 
University of Nebraska Press, 1961), pp. 1-18. 
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mortgages. Since profit was to be made from mortgage loans, and since 
western prosperity made these loans seem safe, investors were plentiful. 
So were borrowers, many of whom were expanionist and extravagant in the 
face of easy credit and overmortgaged their property. However, competition 
5 was greater among lenders than among borrowers. 
Even those farmers who homesteaded public land needed capital. It has 
been estimated that during the 1850's it cost a minimum of a thousand dollars, 
in  addition to the cost of the land, to bring forty acres of Illinois ground into 
production. 
There is no reason to believe that farm-making costs diminished 
after settlement crossed the Missouri. The ·geographer classifies 
eastern Kansas and Nebraska as prairie county, much akin to 
Illinois. As settlement moved into the plains country of central 
and western Kansas and Neeraska, the "cash capital costs" of 
settlement probably rose. 
On the plains frame or log houses cost more, as did fencing. In Illinois 
a farmer generally obtained his water from a nearby stream or, at worst, 
from a shallow well. Deeper and more costly wells were necessary on the 
plains. Even fuel was a problem there. The only satisfactory substitute for 
wood was coal, which had to be purchased from the railroad station. Plains 
farms required more machinery. Only by using larger horse-drawn machines 
could the plains soil b� worked while its moisture content was adequate. 7 
5. An extensive discussion of farm financing is found in  Alan G. Bogue, 
Money at Interest: The Farm Mortgage on the Middle Border, Bison Books 
(Lincoln, Neb.:  University of Nebraska Press, 1961), pp. 1-18. 
6. Ibid, p. 2. 
7. Ibid, p. 3, and Farmer, "Background of Frontier Populism, " p. 411. 
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Thus, through easy credit, agricultural machinery, and plentiful 
land, the West developed. Yet each of the factors which aided and encouraged 
expansion of agriculture also worked to the eventual detriment of the farmer. 
Chief among these detrimental factors, and related to most of them, was the 
railroad. 
The railroad benefited the farmer by supplying cheap land for settlement 
and by providing transportation into undeveloped areas. However this benefit 
was often a mixed blessing, for it induced development of some areas of only 
marginal agricultural value, where settlement should not have occurred. 
Potential settlers were, of course, concerned about problems other than 
Indians, wild animals, and disease. They knew about agricultural necessities 
such as the amount of rainfall, length of the growing season, and the availability 
-
of building materials. But nowhere in the West, except in the mountainous 
areas, is there an abrupt break between regions. They gradually fade into 
one another. So while one area m i ght have adequate rainfall, another place 
a hundred miles from it may not--and in some parts of the West the diJference 
of a few inches in rainfall, or of a few weeks when it occurs, can have a 
pronounced effect on the crop which can be grown. 8 
Railroads linked the rural farmer with the industrial areas of the East. 
Coupled with easy credit, this link enabled him to purchase machinery to 
work his holding and to increase its production. However, the expense of 
machinery reduced the percentage of farm owners and increased the percentage· 
8. Shannon, Farmers' Last Frontier, p. 21. 
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of tenants and workers. The farmer who during prosperous times purchased 
such machinery on credit often damaged himself in the same way as one who 
overextended in expanding his landholdings. During hard times he was as 
readily a victim of financial disaster as were those persons too poor or 
unprogressive to acquire the new implements, and as were others who had 
expanded operations too rapidly during the brief periods of prosperity. All 
"soon joined the ranks of the victims of the land monopolists, those remaining 
9 
on the land no longer being free agents. " 
The same railroads which opened up new areas to settlement and carried 
agricultural machinery to those areas also carried the crops back to m arket. 
Opening up new fertile western lands, creating more farms and f armers 
(including many i�migrants), mechanizing agriculture, and giving formerly 
remote areas access to markets resulted in tremendous overproduction. Farm 
prices hit rock bottom in the years after the Civil War. Farmers countered 
this trend by producing more, not seeing overproduction at the root of their 
problems. For example, while production of such staple crops as corn, wheat, 
and cotton increased from 1866 to 1880 in acreage planted, in bushels produced, 
and in total value, the price per bushel declined just as steadily. lO When the 
evils of overproductim were presented to farmers, they refused to accept 
that explanation, preferring instead to blame others for rural problems. 
9. Shannon, Farmers' Last Frontier, p. 146. 
10. Ibid., pp. 291-303, Buck, Granger Movement, pp. 24-34 and Hicks, 
Populist Revolt, pp. 54-58. Both Shannon and Buck provide numerous graphs 
and tables detailing and illustrating the above-mentioned trends. In addition 
to the pages cited in Shannon, see pages 415 and 417 in the Appendix. 
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Railroads and rate abuses became chief targets of the farmers' frustration. 
Since railroads sold their federal Land grants at low prices to make profit from 
the carrying trade which would develop as those grants were settled and put 
into production, controversial practices developed. To avoid becoming mere 
trunk lines, shipping a farmer's crop to a city where it could be transferred to 
a cheaper competitive carrier, railroads often charged the same price, or 
more, for a short haul as they did for carrying the produce all the way to 
market. Thus a farmer could not save any money by transferring his cargo 
enroute. Furthermore, shipping rates between local points west of Chicago, 
where the vast expanse of land often c aused one road to have a monopoly in an 
area, were much greater than such rates in the East, where competition existed 
between carriers. 
Another monopolistic factor was the trend toward consolidation of lines, 
and hence, toward less competition. This pattern too was especially common 
i n  the West and was partly because many western lines, financially unstable 
like farmers, took advantage of boom periods and became insolvent during hard 
times. Such companies were absorbed by more successful and more wisely 
managed lines. 
Stock-watering was another evil vigorously condemned in rural America. 
By increasing the paper value of the company, the railroad management raised 
the ceiling on its limits of indebtedness. Since most farmers believed that 
railroad funds came from bond issues ra�her than stock sales, and that 
railroads charged high rates to pay off these bonds while they passed out stock 
for nothing, farmers were most vocal in their objections to such . 
behavior. 
18 
Farmers vociferously opposed railroads giving rebates to preferred 
volume customers, since this practice caused the lines to concentrate their 
attention and services in large towns, at the eArpense of small ones. Rebates 
also widened the economic gap between prosperous and successful farmers 
and the poor ones. Farmers hated such trends, and also objected to the 
fav()ritism shown by railroads' free passes to government officials. Radicals 
suspected such practices compromised the position of these officials and allowed 
them to tolerate railroad abuses. Aggravating these grievences was the fact 
that many western areas had actually floated bonds and assumed a public indebt­
edness to help the railroads in their infancy--and had been abused in return. 
Combined with railroad abuses were artifically low crop prices, due not 
only to overproduction, but accomplished indirectly through undergrading the 
farmers' grain at the elevators where it was loaded. When the elevator 
operators sold the grain at its true grade, and for a higher price at m.arket, 
they realized a large profit, part of which rightfully belonged to the farmers. 
The railroads permitted, and even condoned, such practices by forcing farmers 
to use particular elevators. Many times. the companies would not provide cars 
for any loading operation except at particular elevators. In other instances 
the railroads granted elevator operators monopolies along the right-of-way, 
19 
or even owned the elevators themselves. I n  such cases, the farmer had to 
11 take what was offered to him. 
Despite such conditions, westward migration continued. By 1887 the 
boom was at its height. The West w a s  overpopulated and far more capital 
had been invested there than could ever be returned. At the height of the boom, 
the bubble burst and the collapse came. In some areas, such as in Kansas, 
the reaction was sudden and swift. In others, the decline was more gradual. 
But in the entire trans-Mississippi West prosperity vanished and did not 
return for a decade. 
The immediate cause of the collapse was drought, resulting i n  widespread · 
crop failure. In only two of the ten years between 1887 and 1897 did the western 
states attain their normal average rainfall. In five of the dry years, the drought 
was so severe that it caused almost total crop failure. In 1887, only half the 
wheat i n  Kansas could be harvested. In certain areas of the Dakotas the wheat 
crop averaged only 1. 72 bushels per acre in 1889. Settlers in some Nebraska 
counties harvested no crop at all between 1887 and 1894. In 1894, sixty-one of 
the ninety-one Nebraska counties produced no crop whatsoever. 12 
Further aggravating the farmers' plight was further declines in crop 
prices, as farm lands to the east, unaffected by drought, continued to produce. 
Corn which sold for sixty-three cents a bushel in 1881 dropped to twenty-eight 
11. Hicks, Populist Revolt, pp. · 60-78, Buck, Granger Movement, 
pp. 9-19, and Hallie Farmer, "The Railroads and Frontier Populism," 
Mississippi Valley Historical Review, XII  (December, 1926), pp. 387-97. 
12. Farmer, "Economic Background of Frontier Populism," pp. 416-18. : .. 
cents in 1890. The price of wheat fell from $1. 19 a bushel in 1881 to 
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forty-nine cents in 1894. In fact, during the lean years in the West per acre 
production costs exceeded the selling prices for both of these grains. 13 
The financial problems of western settlers during the late Eighties and 
the early Nineties were even more severe because most farme rs were heavily 
mortgaged. The mortgage debt of the western states equalled one-fourth the · 
value of all their farm land. There were counties in Kansas and South Dakota 
. 14 where ninety percent of the land was mortgaged. 
Farmers whose crops were taken by the drought could not make interest 
payments on their mortgages and lost their farms. In Kansas alone, over 
eleven thousand farm mortgages were foreclosed between 1889 and 1893, and 
in fifteen counties loan companies owned seventy-five to ninety-five percent 
of the land by 1895. In addition, much land was forfeited and vacated without 
the formality of foreclosure, as thousands of families abandoned their farms to 
return east. Eighteen thousand prairie schooners crossed the Missouri River 
15 to Omaha in 1891. Entire towns melted away. 
Emigration was most pronounced in the western sections of the affected 
states. While Nebraska showed a slight population gain between 1890 and 1900, 
thirty-five counties lost over sixty-seven thousand persons. South Dakota 
13. Farmer, "Economic Background of Frontier Populism," p. 418, and 
Raymond C. Miller, "The Background of Populism in Kansas," The Mississippi 
Valley Historical Review, XI (March, 1925), p. 476. 
14. Farmer, ''Economic Background of Frontier Populism," pp. 419, 420 
and Miller, ''Background of Populism in Kansas," pp. 476-79. 
15. Farmer, "Economic Background of Frontier Populism, 11pp. 420-22·, 
and Shannon, Farmers' Last Frontier, pp. 307, ,308. 
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experienced a similar situation. While the state was gaining 2, 167 persons , 
twenty-six counties lost 30, 498 people. Twelve western counties s uffered 
half the state loss,  two counties losing half their population. 1 6  
Against this background the agrarian reform movement took on a new 
urgency. Although active farmers' groups had existed since the early years 
after the Civil War, they now became more numerous and more political in 
their aims. 
The first of the important farm organizations after the Civil War was the 
National Grange or, as it was also known, the Patrons of Husbandry. Founded 
in 1867, the Grange organized around the premise that farmers suffered from 
an inferior social, political, and intellectual position in American society. 
Farmers sensed their position as tillers of the soil had suffered a rapid decline 
in status. However, they also knew this decline was not so much a direct one 
on the part of farmers as it was due to the rapid increase in advantages for those 
engaged in other occupations. In an era of budding business organizations, 
manufacturers' associations, and trade unions, farmers realized the need for 
organization and for presenting a united front in their own defense. 17 
The National Grange worked toward all these ends, and the original social 
and educational features of the Grange were soon secondary to its economic and 
political activities. These included cooperative stores and grain elevators, and 
even an attempt to manufacture their own agricultural machinery. 1 8  But Granger 
1 6 .  Farmer, "Economic Background of Frontier Populism,�' pp. 420-22. 
17. Buck, The Granger Movement, pp. 34-39. 
18. Ibid�, pp. 360-70. 
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activity against the railroads was the organization's most significant and most 
successful attempt to improve the farmers' situation. 
Working on the state level, the Grange waged a successful campaign 
against railroad abuses in Illinois, Iowa, Minnesota, and Wisconsin, and, to a 
lesser degree, in several other states, In general, the Granger Laws, as 
they were c alled, aimed at regulating railroad freight rates, passenger fares, 
and grain warehouses and ele_vators. While the rate provisions were invariably 
repealed and replaced by more innocuous legislation prohibiting only rate 
discrimination, and although all such regulations were universally opposed 
by the carriers, railroad rates did iin fact decline during the height of Granger 
t. 't 1 9  a c  iv1 y. 
The success of the National Grange and the deplorable condition of 
agriculture gave rise to numerous farm organizations. Among the most 
significant of these were the Farmers' Alliances. Like the Grange, the 
Farmers' Alliances were a loosely knit confederation of state and local groups. 
Lacking cohesive central leadership, the Alliances became constantly involved 
i n  internal squabbles and in factional differences. Yet they accomplished some 
important goals for the farm movement. The . Farmers' Alliances heavily 
involved themselves in cooperative economic movements. These operations 
went far beyond the farm store and grain elevator activities of the Grange. 
The Southern Alliance attempted a huge cooperative effort to control both 
19.  Buck, The Granger Movement, pp. 124-238, passim. 
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selling of crops and purchase of farm supplies. In this regard, the Farmers' 
Alliance Exchange was organized. At first this organization merely pooled 
the grain of individual members and, for a commission, attempted to c1cmand 
a fair price. It also tried to save farmers money on agricultural implements 
by purchasing machinery in quantity, passing on to individual farmers the 
s avings realized. However the Exchange was undone when it schemed to provide 
its own credit to Alliance members and instead provided for its own financial 
. 20 ruin. 
During the height of Alliance activity and, not coincidently, during the 
depth of farm depression, the agrarian reform movement took on definate 
political overtones. While the farm organiz ations did not repudiate third 
party movements, they viewed the political allegience of individual members 
as a matter of personal decision. Although many former Grangers and members 
of other farm protest groups had supported the Greenback Party in 1878 , 
no agrarian organization had officially and openly called upon its membership 
to abandon the two major parties. Both the Grange and the Farmers' Alliances 
originally planned to work within the two party system and ultimately expected 
to capture one, hopefully the Democratic, by placing farmer candidates on its 
ticket, and by then electing them to high public office. 21 
By 1890, farm organizations began to perceive this plan of action was 
not working out. This feeling was due in part to the frustrations of a continuing 
20. Hicks, Populist Revolt, pp. 133-39. 
21. Ibid. , pp. 96, 141-42, 147-49. 
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agricultural depression and to a consequent impatience with the painfully 
slow rate of change which farmers felt necessary to improve their condition. 
They came to believe that members of their ranks who had been sent as agrarian 
representatives to Congress or to the Senate were being corrupted by a party 
system which was inherently evil and hopelessly dominated by greedy eastern 
• t  l" t 22 cap1 a is s. 
The idea of uniting not only the various farm groups, but also labor unions 
in an effort to capture for the poor working people some power and voice in the 
federal government was discussed in National Alliance meetings in both 1888 
and 1889. The formal presentation of a plan for a third party took place at a. 
National Alliance meeting i n  December 1890 at Ocala, Florida. However, the 
idea of a third party was not well received by all factions present at the Ocala 
meeting. Southerners feared such a move would destroy the white supremecist 
one-party system in their section and that a split in the ranks of white farmers 
would augment the power of southern blacks. Still others present at Ocala 
retained confidence in the ability of a united farm bloc to capture the national 
Democratic Party in 1892. However Northern Alliance members, buoyed by 
radical representatives from the drought-ridden and devastated trans-Mississippi 
23 
West, generally favored a third party movement. 
At the annual meeting of the Northern Alliance held at Omaha, Nebraska 
the following month, six fundamental demands were presented. The most 
22. Hicks, Populist Revolt, pp. 151-52. 
23. John Hicks, "The Birth of the Populist Party , "  Minnesota History� 
IX (S19ptember, 1928), pp. 226· -28. 
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important of these called for free silver; government ownership of railroads 
and telegraphs; abolition of national banks and substitution of direct paper note 
issues; direct election of the president, vice president, and senators; and the 
24 secret ballot. 
The debate over a third party came to a head in Cincinnati in May, 1891.  
Delegates from all states and of all politic a 1 persuasions descended upon the 
Cincinnati meeting, but it was dominated by western radicals and by "professional" 
third-party men. A major conflict emerged at the meeting between the faction 
led by Ignatius Donnelly of Minnesota, who wanted to form a third party on the 
spot, and the group led by James B. Weaver of Iowa, who wanted only to 
draft resolutions, but who held out the possibility of a third party i f  neither 
the Republicans nor the Democrats proved responsive to the resolutions produced. 
The result of the conflict was a. compromise. The convention formed the People� 
Party and its executive committee was directed to attend a proposed conference 
of reform organizations in St. Lou is in February, 1892. If possible, the 
committee was. to enlist these other organizations in a united political effort. 
If this arrangement could not be made, the committee was directed to call a 
national convention by June 1, 1892 to name a presidential ticket, and the 
Populists would go it alone. 25 
In November of 1891, the executive committee of the Populist Party 
visited the meeting of the Southern Alliance supreme council. Urged by other 
24. Hicks, "The Birth of the Populist Party, 11 p. 229. 
25. Hicks, Populist Revolt, pp. 211-16. 
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reform leaders who also attended, Southern Alliance officers, although still 
distressed about the possibility of splitting the white vote in their section, 
adopted the Northern Alliance's wait-and-see attitude. They instructed Alliance 
congressmen to boycott party caucuses in Washington. 
The decisive meeting came at St. Louis in February, 1892. Present. were 
leaders of the Alliance, the Knights of Labor, Anti-Monopolists1 Prohibitionists, 
People's Party, Reform Press, and Women's Alliance. In all, eight hundred 
delegates representing twenty-one different organizations were awarded seats. 
While the majority of delegates at the St. Louis convention favored a third 
party, a highly vocal minority opposed such a move and threatened to bolt the 
meeting if it were attempted. To preserve harmony, the convention did nothing 
more than draw up a platform, including a list of demands upon the national 
government. Having accomplished this, the convention adjourned. However, 
a majority of the delegates remained to hear Donnelly and Weaver again debate 
whether or not the new party should procede before giving the two major parties 
a chance to react to Populist demands. Weaver's policy of delay was adopted . 
and further action on the new party was postponed again until July 4, 1892, when 
a meeting was to be held at Omaha. In the meantime, local organizations were 
requested to meet, to ratify the St. Louis platform, and to select delegates 
to state nominating conventions. 
The Republican Party met at Minneapolis on June 7, 1892 and, as expected, 
nominated the incumbant President Benjamin Harrison. The Democratic National 
2 7  
Convention convened i n  Chicago on June 21, nominating Grover Cleveland once 
again. Agrarian groups found little to please them in either candidate or 
platform. 
Meeting i n  Omaha i n  July, the national convention of the People's Party 
experienced little difficulty in securing either a platform or a candidate. The 
platform had been constructed at the St. Louis conference, and in the interim 
the leading contender for the presidential nomination, Colonel L. L. Polk, 
president of the Southern Alliance died. An attempt to draft Judge Walter Q. 
Gresham of Illinois failed when he withdrew his name from consideration. This 
development meant the nomination would go by default to one of the old third-
party leaders of the Northwest. Since many people considered Donnelly to 
be far too radical, only James B. Weaver, who had been the Greenback Party 
candidate in 1880, remained. He was paired on the ticket with General James 
G. Field of Virginia. Thus two retired generals, one Union and one Confederate, 
26 
made up the Populist ticket in  1892. 
The results in the November election was viewed with mixed emotion by 
the Populists. For a new party, they did very well. By polling over a million 
votes and by gaining twenty-two electoral votes, Weaver became the first 
third-party candidate to break into the electoral college since the Civil War. 
The People's Party presidential ticket carried the states of Colorado, Idaho, 
Nevada, and Kansas. It  lost Nebraska by less than a hundred votes. In 
26. A detailed account of the St. Louis Convention is found in Hicks, 
Populist Revolt, pp. 223-37 , and in "Birth of the Populist Party, " pp. 238-47. 
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addition the Populists elected governors in Kansas, North Dakota and Colorado. 
Eight to ten congressmen succeeded because of Populist support and a consid-
erable number of others owed election to deals made with the People's Party. 
Furthermore, about fifty state officials and fifteen hundred county officials 
and state legislators gained office on the Populist tick�t. 27 
However, cold analysis shows that the strength of the People's Party 
was not what its supporters belived it to be. Populist victories in several 
western states were accomplished only through fusion with the Democrats. 
Furthermore, Populist strength in N�vada, Colorado, and Wyoming was due 
more to the fact that these states had economies dependent on silver mining, 
than to any popular sympathy with the Populist platform. The People's Party 
made no mark at all in the South, East, or Middle-West. Even in his home 
state of Iowa, Weaver polled less than five percent of the vote. Failure in 
the South was due in part to the presence of a complete Populist slate on the 
ballot. While white southern voters might have been willing to cast their votes 
for the presidential candidate of a third party, they were not willing to destroy 
the Democratic Party on the state and local levels, thus allowing a successful 
black-Republican coalition, Farmers in the East and Mid-West, unaffected 
by drought, had no protest vote to register. 
_
28 
Events of the next few years aided the Populist cause. Grover Gleveland, 
returned to the White House in 1892, was a sound money man, and his gold 
27. Hicks, The Populist Revolt, pp. 261-69. 
28. Ibid. 
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standard principles rose above all his other policies--as illustrated by events 
following the Panic of 1893. When, i n  1894, an army of jobless workers 
descended on Washington, and when i n  that same year federal troops were used 
to break the Pullman Strike in Chicago, Cleveland did nothing except veto a bill 
to coin bullion stored in the Treasury vaults, thus prolonging the deflationary 
movement which was partly responsible for unemployment and labor unrest. 
As might be expected under these circumstances, the Populists did well in the 
midterm election of 1894, increasing their vote by fifty percent, and gathering 
some labor support. Yet the Republicans regained control in many western areas. 
. 29 
Like the Democrats, the Republicans were beginning to talk like the Populists. 
The election of 1894 showed the Democrats that their party was losing 
touch with the masses. In the West in particular, most of their supporters 
had gone over to the Republicans or the Populists. · They solved their problem 
and bid for Populist support by nominating William Jennings Bryan of Nebraska 
in 1896, and by adopting a free-silver plank. While the Democratic presidential 
candidate was acceptable to the PopuUsts, they could not support that party' s  
choice o f  vice president, a conservative eastern banker, shipbuilder, and 
railroad president, Arthur Sewall. Instead they nominated a noted agrarian 
radical, Tom Watson of Georgia. The resulting confusion on both the ballot 
and the issues allowed the election of the conservative Republican candidate, 
William McKinley of Ohio. Although Bryan's 6, 468, 000 votes were more than 
29. Shannon, Farmers! Last Frontier, p. 322. 
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any candidate had previously received, and more than any Democrat would 
get for the next t\venty years, the election of McKinley meant the continuation 
of Cleveland's fiscal policy. It also meant the end of any hope for meaningful 
agrarian reform. Bryan would try again but he would find the agrarian issues 
30 
were dead. 
30. Shannon, Farmers' Last Frontier, pp. 323-26. · ! For a more detailed 
discussion of events after 1892 see Paul W. Glad, McKinley, Bryan, and the 
. People (New York, J.B.  Lippencott Co. , 1964)., and Robert F. Durden, The 
Climax of Populism (Lexington, Ky. : University of Kentucky Press, 1966). 
CHAPTER III 
Agriculture and Agrarian Discontent in Illinois 
Even though the People's Party showed very little strength in Illinois 
in 1892, the state played a major role in the development of American agri-
culture and in the growth of agrarian discontent. In many respects, events 
i n  the state were closely related to western conditions. Increasing land 
sales indicated that Illinois was one of the biggest population losers in the 
great migration westward. The original exodus from the state diminished 
1 
after 1876 but began anew in  1884. 
Railroads, big enemy of the western farmer, were s imilarly perceived 
by the agrarian element of Illinois. Long haul-short haul abuses were not 
unique to the trans-Mississippi West, and even though rates declined in the 
Seventies, Illinois farmers thought transportati9n charges were still too high. 
In 1880, for example, it cost eighty-six cents to ship a two hundred pound hog 
from Chicago to New York, or ten percent of its total value. To send a bushel 
of wheat over the same route cost twenty cents. But, to ship that wheat only 
110 miles from Rock Falls to Chicago cost ten to twelve cents. Furthermore, 
the Eastern Illinois Railroad charged the same rate for hauling produce from 
Chicago to East St. Louis as it did from Chicago to Rossville, a distance only 
one-third as far. As in the West, Illinois railroads "gave poor service, 
1 .  Shannon, Farmers' Last Frontier, pp. 34,_ 39. 
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weighed commodities incorrectly, cooperated with monopolistic elevators, 
and outraged farmers by refusing to put up fences along the tracks or to 
2 pay damages . "  
Illinois farmers , like their western counterparts, suspected that free 
railroad passes to officials compromised their integrity and influenced both 
state legislators and members of the Illinois State Board of Railroad and 
Warehouse Commissioners. In 1885, the state board obviously favored the 
railroads at the expense of the farmers. 
Equally distasteful to Illinois farmers were trusts and monopolies of 
all kinds. In particular, they resented local combinations of grain buyers, 
who united to hold down prices . They held a similar attitude toward terminal 
elevator operators in Chicago who were constantly accused of undergrading 
wheat. Livestock growers complained because they were charged double the 
market price for feed their animals consumed in the Chicago stockyards. 
Furthermore , the farmers suspected that handlers in  the yards deliberately 
damaged animals so they would not bring full market price. Not only did 
farmers feel that they were being mistreated as producers, but with good 
reason believed they were being taken advantage of as consumers also. Most 
implement manufacturers sold their products only through agents or county 
3 
dealers who obtained their profit by raising prices twenty-five or thirty percent. 
2 .  Roy V. Scott, The Agrarian Movement in Illinois 1880-1896, Illinois 
Studies in the Social Sciences, Vol . 52 (Urbana, Ill. : The University of Illinois 
Press, 1962). 
3. Ibid. , pp. 16, 17.  
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A more basic farm grievence was that agrarian interests were under-
represented in state government. Although over half Illinois' population in 
1880 lived in rural areas, only fourteen of the 369 state legislators were 
farmers. Farmers felt this lack of representation meant their interests were 
not being well served. Nowhere was this disatisfaction more apparent than in 
the Illinois tax system, under which farmers felt forced to shoulder a dispro-
portionate share of the burden. They suspected that rural property, which 
was in plain sight, was more often assessed than the hard-to-find .stocks, 
4 
bonds, and safes of urban residents. 
After 1881, falling prices accentuated these grievances. Price trends 
for Illinois produce paralleled those for western crops. The cereal-growing 
central and south portions of the state were affected as the price for corn, 
wheat, and oats fell from 1881 levels of 53 cents, $1 .  22, and 43 cents to lows 
of 1 8  cents, 45 cents, and 15 cents respectively by the mtd-1890's. Northern 
farmers and some central Illi.nois operators who raised livestock were better 
off, since prices for farm animals did not decline as rapidly or as much as 
5 
prices for cereal crops. Unlike the West, Illinois was unaffected by drought 
and continued through the entire last half of the nineteenth century as a top 
grain-producing state. The state led the nation i n  wheat production from 1859 
to 1879,  and in corn production for every decade between 1860 and 1900 except 
the Eighties. 6 
4 .  Scott, The Agrarian Movement in Illinois 1880-1896, p. 19. 
5.  Shannon, Farmers' Last Frontier, pp. 296, 297. 
6.  Ibid. , p .  163. 
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Allan G. Bogue's study of farm mortgages, Money at Interest, helps 
illustrate the relatively stable circumstances of Illinois agriculture compared 
. 7 
to western agrarian conditions. Money at Interest examines the activities of 
Ira Davenport and Sons, land speculators and money lenders active in Kansas, 
Nebraska, Iowa, the Dakota Territory, and Illinois. In Illinois, . the Davenports 
made loans over a longer period of time, for greater amounts, and with a 
smaller percentage of foreclosures than they did in any other place they 
conducted business--Iowa, Kansas, Nebraska, and the Dakota Territory. Only 
in Nebraska did they make a slightly greater number of loans. But those 
loans were for significantly smaller amounts, and had a higher percentage 
of foreclosures, than did Illinois loans. 
TABLE 1 
LOANS MADE BY IRA DAVENPORT AN'D SONS 
Years in Number Average amount Percent 
State bm;iness of loans of loan Foreclosed 
Illinois 3 1  1379 $1870 1 .  45 
Kansas 25 571 600 6. 70 
Nebraska 30 1610 700 3 . 00 
Iowa 13 878 631 7 . 40 
Dakota Terr. 3 140 314 23. 60 
Source: Allan G. Bogue, Money at Interest: the Farm Mortgage 
on the Middle Border, pp. l3, 29, 6 1 .  
7 .  See footnote 5 in Chapter II for the complete citation. 
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Table 1 shows the Davenports definitely had more confidence in Illinois 
agriculture than they did in western agrarian development--and with good 
reason, for in Illinois their returns were steadiest and greatest. Yet the 
table above does not tell the entire story. 
The Davenports started lending money in Illinois, Iowa and Kansas in the 
same year, 1868. In Nebraska they started three years later. But their 
success in these four states varied greatly. In Nebraska they made a large 
number of loans each year from 1871 to 1899. But the hard times in that 
state during the drought are obvious since 23 of 48 foreclosures in  Nebraska 
came between 1881 and 1891. The worst single year was 188�, when 13 
landholdings were forfeited. 8. In Kansas, there were no foreclosures during 
the drought, but this was because very few loans were made in that state after 
1883. In fact, only 21 of Davenports' 571 Kansas loans were made between 1883 
and 1903. A combination of foresight, luck, and loss of confidence in their 
ability to make money in Kansas was responsible for their good fortune in 
9 
averting setbacks there. 
Dakota investments brought financial disaster to the Davenports. During 
the three years they loaned money in the Dakota Territory, they financed 140 
mortgages. However, in 1880 they were forced to foreclose on 27 of those 
10 loans and did no business in the Dakota Territory after that date. The 
Davenports' experience in Dakota was partly responsible for bringing their 
8. Bogue, Money at Interest, p.  61. 
9. Ibid. , p. 47, 57, 58. 
10. Ibid. , p. 29. 
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business in Iowa to an end. The company made 878 loans in Iowa between 
1868 and 1880, with a high but not intolerable foreclosure rate of 7. 4 percent. 
But this high rate coupled with the Dakota disaster, their involvement in a 
usury suit, and doubts about the honesty and capability of their Iowa agent, 
caused the Davenports to cease operations in that state after 1880. 11 
In Illinois the picture was entirely different. Illinois investment was 
by far the most stable for the Davenports--only 20 foreclosures on 1379 loans. 
Furthermore, conditions in Illinois during the late Eighties were so good that 
they made no foreclosures whatsoever, although they negotiated 186 loans 
between 1884 and 1891, 63 during the peak drought years in the West. 12 While 
no sweeping conclusions can be accurately drawn from the investments of 
only one company, there i s  no reason to believe that the Davenports' operation 
was not representative of most such companies during that period. If the 
Davenports were typical land speculators and investors, then their dealings 
indicate that agrarian conditions i n  Illinois were much more sound and stable 
than those on the Middle Border. 
Another factor differentiating Illinois agriculture from its western 
counterpart was the state's relatively high rate of tenancy. Between 1880 
and 1900, about one of three Illinois farmers was either a sharecropper or 
a cash tenant. Although the rate of farm tenancy in Illinois was consistantly 
higher than in the five western states, it showed much more stability. Kansas, 
11. Bogue, Money at Interest, pp. 31-43. 
12. Ibid. , p. 13 
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Iowa, and South Dakota, in particular, experienced a marked increase in 
farm tenancy throughout all or part of those twenty years while tenancy 
conditions in Illinois changed but very little. This discrepency was probably 
due to differing conditions in the two regions. In the West where good land 
was originally plentiful and cheap, low tenancy rates could be expected. Most 
settlers could afford to own their farms, particularly when sources for loans 
were plentiful. Illinois was settled much earlier, howe\•er, and by 1880 not 
much good cheap land was available. Poor farmers in Illinois, not able to 
purchase good land there, were forced into the role of renters. Furthermore, 
as hard times struck agriculture, compounded in the West by the drought, many 
over-extended farmers lost their holdings. If they continued to occupy the 
land, they did so as tenants of their original creditor or of a person who 
TABLE 2 
COMPARATIVE FARM TENANCY RATES 
FOR SIX STATES: 1880 - 1900 
Percentage of Tenants 
State 1880 1890 1900 
Illinois 31.  4 34. 0 39. 3  
Kansas 1 6 . 3  28. 2 35. 2 
Nebraska 1 8 .  0 24. 7 26. 9 
Iowa 23. 8 28. 1 34. 9 
North Dakota . . 7. 0 8 . 5  
South Dakota . .  13. 2 21.  8 
Source: Fred A. Shannon, The Farmer1s Last 
Frontier: .Agriculture, 1 860- 1 8 9 ·7 ,  
p. 418. 
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purchased the property after the grantor foreclosed. This trend is clearly 
shown by the increasing tenancy rates in Table 2 .  In Illinois the agrarian 
economic situation was more secure, as the Davenport data and Table 2 indicate. 
The low number of foreclosures in Illinois was reflected in a relatively stable 
tenancy rate just as the high number of foreclosures in the West, as times 
grew tough, resulted in increasing farm tenancy, changing farmers who were 
over-extended from the ranks of owners to the ranks of renters. 
In addition to the relative stability of Illinois tenancy rate, i t  should also 
be noted that, compared to the western states, Illinois farm tenants showed a 
greater tendency toward sharecropping instead of cash rental. 13 This .fact in 
itself is significant. Under the typical sharecropping agreement, the landlord 
allowed the tenant to occupy and work the tract in return for a percentage of 
the crop when it was harvested. Furthermore, it was not unusual for the 
landlord to advance money or credit for farm implements, and even for seed 
and fertilizer, to the tenant. Such an arrangement was an ideal one for the 
tenant farmer during hard times. Unlike the cash tenant or the mortgagee, 
who both had fixed expenditures for land, the sharecropper's expenses varied 
somewhat with his success as a farmer. After poor harvests, while he would 
· not have much to show for his work, neither would his debt be overwhelming 
since he paid his landlord only a fixed percentage of his crop. Thus, the 
financial obligations of the sharecropper were always proportional to his 
earnings. The cash tenant and the landowner, on the ot her hand, were required 
13. Shannon, Farmers' Last Frontier, p. 418. A good discussion of 
tenant farming and sharecropping, though slanted toward southern agriculture, 
is found in Shannon's book, pp. 88-95. 
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to make a specific money payment to their creditors, no matter how good or 
how bad their harvests had been. In good years, the cash tenant and landowning · 
farmer could fare much better than the sharecropper whose own profit never 
exceeded a set percentage of his c.rop. But in retrospect, given the condition 
of agriculture after the Civil War, sharecropping seems to have been the best 
opportunity for a farmer. Also in retrospect, tenant farming in general was 
advantageous. When hard times struck, the tenant had far less to lose by 
deserting the tract he was working than did the farmer who was mortgaged to 
the land and had money invested in it. Farm tenancy thus ameliorated the 
hardships agricultural depression brought down upon the farmer, and the 
circumstances of farm tenancy in Illinois can be viewed as further evidence 
of the relatively satisfactory condition of the state's agrarian economy. Hence, 
it is difficult to understand why so many organizations spurred by agrarian 
discontent, and dedicated to agrarian reform, got their start in Illinois .  Yet 
all major organizations dedicated to agrarian reform, whether native to Illinois 
or not, were exceptionally .strong in. that state. 
The National Grange, although originating in Minnesota, had an especially 
active organization in Illinois. Not only did the Illinois Grange obtain some 
unprecendented state railroad legislation in the 1870's, but some Grangers 
helped establish an autonomous parallel political organization, the Independent 
Reform Party, which achieved tremendous local successes in 1873. The party's 
candidates appeared on the ballot in 66 of the state's 102 counties, and carried 
53 of them. The R�publicans and Democrats were thoroughly defeated, carrying 
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only 16 and 20 counties respectively, while other independent tickets captured 
13. The 1873 successes were repeated in the state election of 1874. Independent 
Reform candidates captured three of the state's nineteen congressional seats 
and destroyed Republican control in the state legislature by electing three state 
senators and twenty-seven representatives. However, the bright future of this 
party dimmed in the late Seventies when it was absorbed into the Greenback 
Party. 1 4  
Two other, later agrarian organizations active in politics were the 
Farmers' Mutual Benefit Association (FMBA) and the National Farmers' Alliance. 
Both of these organizations were born in Illinois. Milton George, a wealthy 
Cook County farmer, founded the National Farmers' Alliance, primarily as 
an offshoot of his successful agrarian newspaper, the Western Rural. However, 
George was not interested in the future of his paper, already widely-read, so 
much as he worried about the future of American agriculture. He used his 
newspaper to communicate this concern to his readers and gradually developed 
a philosophy which became the cornerstone of Populist thought. In 1879, 
George's attention focused on the farmers' problems with the railroads and on 
the need for g:>vernment regulation. After discussing this issue at length i n  
the Western Rural, George suggested that his readers write to Washington and 
to their state legislatures requesting such regulation as upheld by the Supreme 
Court in Munn vs, Illinois. He promoted this suggestion by mailing out thousands 
14. Buck, Granger Movement, pp. 88, 89, 94, 95. 
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of petitions to his subscribers, to known Grangers, and to farmers' clubs 
throughout the Middle West. When response was slow, George sensed that 
some organized effort was needed and, again through the Western Rural, 
urged the formulation of farm clubs to promote agrarian interests. Sensitive 
to the reasons behind the decline of the Grange, George suggested membership 
not be secret, that the clubs be politically active and openly partisan, and that 
dues be low enough to be within the means of all farmers. He .even went so far 
as to print a model constitution in his paper--a document which was ultimately 
adopted and used by the Alliance throughout its existance. 15 
Farmers' reaction to George's idea was not spontaneous, and 'they called 
on him to provide them with an example. Consequently he agreed to establish a 
local organization i n  Cook County and called a meeting for tha.t purpose i n  
April, 1880. When only one farmer appeared for the meeting, George recruited 
two staff workers from the newspaper. Each of the four individuals became an 
officer, and the Cook County Alliance was born in the office of the ·western 
Rural, where the entire movement was.'to be headquartered for the next seven 
16 years. 
Until there were enough local alliances to justify the creation of the national 
body, the Cook County group issued charters to farmers who were willing to 
. . 
organize themselves under George's published constitution . The first group 
so inclined lived near Filly, Nebraska, and by August, 1880, local alliances 
15. Scott, Agrarian Movement in Illinois, pp. 22-26. 
16.  Ibid. , pp. 27-28. . 
were scattered throughout Kansas, Nebraska, Iowa, Wisconsin, and 
Illinois. At this point George called a national convention. 
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On October 14, 1880, 623 delegates from thirteen states met in Chicago 
to consider action against the railroads. When this meeting adjourned, about 
hall remained to form the National Farmers' Alliance. Although state organ­
izations were at first difficult to establish, the number of local alliances 
grew rapidly. From 200 locals in November, 1880, the number grew to over 
500 two months later and to 940 by the following October, despite vicious 
attacks by farm papers competing with the Western Rural--attacks which 
continued until control of the national organization was wrested from George 
in 1887. 17 
Unlike the National Farmers' Alliance, the Farmers' Mutual Benefit 
Association was not the work of one man. In 1883, a group of Johnson 
County farmers discovered their local grain dealer uncooperative at harvest 
time. When he declined to purchase their crop, they contacted the m arket in 
St. Louis, hired their own railroad car, and disposed of it directly. To their 
great surprise they found that elimination of the middleman increased their 
profit. Word of this success quickly spread throughout the county and their 
neighbors began to join i n  the selling effort. Out of this union emerged a 
secret organization named the Farmers' Mutual Benefit Association. 
The FMBA grew slowly, partly from design. Its leaders hoped to 
avoid the rapid expansion and loose central organization which they felt had 
17. Scott, Agrarian Movement in Illinois, pp. 28-31. 
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weakened George's National Farmers' Alliance. Nevertheless, by 1887 the 
FMBA counted over two thousand members in small local clubs scattered 
throughout southern Illinois. Fred G .  Blood of Jefferson County was appointed 
to lead a central organization empowered to establish locals anywhere in the 
1 8  
United . States. However, Blood soon fell out of favor with the membership 
and was replaced by Jdm P. Stelle of Hamilton County. 
Under Stelle's able direction, the FMBA continued to grow. Deterior-
ating agrarian conditions prompted its rapid expansion into neighboring states. 
In October, 1887, the organization had389 local lodges. A year later the number 
rose to 942. By November, 1890, Stelle reported a total of 2, 181 lodges and 
by the following November counted almost 90 percent of this figure lived i n  
1 9  
Illinois or Indiana. 
Within Illinois the growth of the FMBA was equally spectacular. In 1886 
the group's strength was limited to six counties. By the end of the frillowing year 
it occupied most of southern Illinois, absorbing independent agrarian organiza-
tions in Marion, Clinton, and Washington counties. By 1889, the FMBA was 
successfully competing with the National Farmers' Alliance in central Illinois 
and established strong locals in Clark, Cumberland, and Shelby counties. A 
year later it moved into the western section of the state, mainly along the 
lower Illinois River, in Madison, Jersey, and Macoupin counties. 20 
18. Scott, Agrarian Movement in Illinois ,  pp. 45,  46. 
19. Ibid. , pp. 49, 50. 
20. Ibid. 
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However, the FMBA never was very successful in the counties between 
the Illinois and Mississippi rivers. Its failure in the area was due mainly to 
the work of Blood. After his removal as head of the FMBA, Blood became 
associated with the Souther;1 Alliance and successfully organized the inter­
river counties for that group. The Southern Alliance, or National Farmers' 
Alliance and Industrial Union, was organized by Charles W. Macune of the 
Texas state Alliance after it broke with George in 1887 over the willingness of 
the National Farmers' Alliance to admit Negro members. A year later the 
Southern Alliance merged with the Arkansas Agricultural Wheel, while the 
FMBA rejected a similar offer of consolidation. After the rejection, Southern 
Alliance organizers, including Blood, appeared in Illinois and Indiana and 
undermined FMBA strength in both states. By 1890, southern leaders had 
established a state alliance. After the state organization was perfected in 1891, 
the Southern Alliance enjoyed considerable success in Illinois' western counties, 
dominating the area between the Illinois and Mississippi rivers south of Rock 
Island, as well as a band of counties on the east bank of the Illinois River. By 
the end of 1891, the organization was established in twenty-six counties, and 
21 
claimed a membership of over twelve thousand. 
In northern Illinois the dominant agrarian organization was the Grange 
which, due to the hard times of the late 1880's, began a recovery from its 
drastic decline in the latter Seventies. A fifth association, also showing strength 
21. Scott, Agrarian Movement in Illinois, pp. 50-56. 
in the northern part of the state, was the Patrons of Industry. However 
4 5  
the backbone of agrarian reform in Illinois was the alliance movement. By 
December, 1890, it included over 2 ,  000 local clubs with approximately 
62, 000 members, an average of one member to every four farms in the 
state. With almost half-again as many locals as the Grange had at its height 
22 
in 1875, organized farmers were a power to be reckoned with in Illinois. 
22. Scott, Agrarian Movement in Illinois, p. 61, and Buck, Granger 
Movement, p.  64. Membership totals in the various farm organizations in 
1890 are as follows: The National Farmers' Alliance had 150 locals and 7000 
members, the FMBA claimed 1650 lodges and 43, 175, members; the Southern 
Alliance had 160 locals and 3400 members; and the Grange, with 196 local 
bodies, recorded 7500 members. 
CHAPTER IV 
The Peoplers Party in Iliinois 
The Populists did not do well in Illinois in the election of 1892, despite 
the state's proclivity to farm organizations. The party's national ticket polled 
a mere 2. 54 percent of the vote in Illinois, ranking the state thirty-first in 
Populist strength in 1892. In only twelve states did the ticket do worse, and 
i n  the Mid-West, only Ohio gave Weaver less support than he got in Illinois. 
On the state level, the Populist gubanatorial candidate polled four thousand votes 
less than the Prohibition candidate, and none of the Populist nominees for 
Congress or the state legislature were elected. In fact, independent strength 
in Illinois was less than in the mid-term elections of 1890. In the forty-third 
senatorial district a Populist congressional candidate won 1 1 ,  940 votes in 
1890; two years later third party strength declined to 6, 916. Populist nominees 
in other districts did even worse. In the forty-second district, once a center 
1 
of FMBA strength, the People's candidate polled a pitiful 297 votes. 
The failure of the Populist Party in Illinois may be attributed to several 
events and trends of the late 1880's and early 1890's. Foremost among these 
reasons, and central to most of the others, was the great variety of farm 
organizations in the state. The same factors which made Illinois the nucleus 
of the agrarian reform movement also served to undermine the strength of the 
1 .  Hicks, Populist Revolt, p. 263 and Scott, Agrarian Movement in 
Illinois, pp. 133-34. 
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only political party dedicated to meeting farmers' needs. The major farm 
organizations were fiercely independent and they jealously protected their 
autonomy. In a state completely divided among them by the mid-Eighties, 
expansion of one group came at the expense of another. A major cause for 
concern developed by the end of the decade as the Southern Alliance began to 
make inroads into the strength of the National Farmers' Alliance and the FMBA. 
Not only did this challenge weaken these two organizations, but the close ties 
between the Southern Alliance and third party politics brought to Illinois a com­
mitment to action which many farmers were not willing to accept. 
The idea of independent political action by Illinois farmers· originated in 
1886, when the National Farmers' Alliance organized a lobby i n  the state 
legislature. Two years later, the Grange followed suit. But going one step 
further, the Grange developed a list of state legislators opposing needed farm 
measures and urged that these individuals be defeated. Both the FMBA and the 
Northern Alliance closely questioned each candidate about his stand on farm 
issues and rejected those who took unsatisfactory positions. The FMBJ\ 
bluntly warned the old parties about the possibility of independent political a.ction 
if the farmers were not placated. 
But earlier third party movements had met with little success in Illinois . 
Name changes of the leading third party throughout the 1870's and 1880's 
illustrated a swing away from serving farmers' needs. Changes from National 
Greenback to Greenback Labor to Anti-Monopoly showed the increasing 
committment of third party leadership to the labor movement rather than to 
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agrarian reform. The convention which formed the Anti-Monopoly Party in 
Chicago in 1883 ignored the Farmers' Alliance completely. But formation of 
another new party in 1887 quickly restored the farmers' voice in politics. 
Although the name National Union Labor Party gave the appearance of labor control, 
former Greenbackers and other rural elements dominated from the outset. While 
its entire slate was spectacularly unsuccessful in 1888, the spectre of agrarian 
political action motivated both major parties to be more receptive to farmers' 
2 
demands. 
In such areas as Champaign County, where the Republicans were 
supreme, the Democrats hoped for aid from the Alliance, and 
in southern Illinois both parties attempted to placate discontented 
groups by naming candidates who were identified as being fav­
orable to agriculture. In the nineteenth district, the RepubUcans 
selected an FMBA member as their nominee, while in the 
twentieth district the Democrats endorsed the c andidate of the 
Union Labor party . . . .  But when the votes were counted, it was 
found that not only had no independent been elected but the candi­
dates endorsed by an old party i.n an effort to upset a favorite had 
similarly failed. When victories on the local level also failed to 
materialize, the Union Labor party ceased to exist as a political 
entity. 3 
The failure of the third party movement in Illinois during the Eighties may 
be attributed partly to the relatively good condition of I llinois agriculture, 
compared to states where radical parties had more success. Added to the 
reluctance of farmers to ('.!Ooperate with labor representatives, and to the inability 
of fiercely competitive rival agrarian groups to unite, this factor doomed the 
2� Scott, Agrarian Movement i n  Illinois ,  pp. 84-87. 
3. Ibid. , p. 87. 
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future of any independent political action in Illinois. The crushing blow to 
third party politics. in the state was delivered by the election of 1890 and its 
aftermath. Rural voters sent three independent legislators to the general assembly 
in that year. These three held the balance of power between the major parties 
in a protracted struggle over the election of a U . S .  Senator. The two candidates 
for this office were Alson J. Streeter, noted agrarian liberal and presidential 
candidate of the Union Labor Party in 1888, and John M .  Palmer, long-time 
attorney for the Illinois Central Railroad. When two of these independent 
legislators deserted Streeter and, under very suspicious circumstances, threw 
their support to the railroad man, the third party movement in Illinois was 
completely discredited. This disaster, coupled with the loss of state Populist 
leader Herman E. Taubeneck who went to Washington, D. C. as the party's 
national chairman, and the dismissal of the radical editor of the Farmers' Voice, 
published by Montgomery Ward and Company, deprived agrarian radicals of 
badly needed leadership and sealed the fate of the People's· Party i� Illinois. 5 
Though the Populists could not claim real success anywhere in Illinois 
in 1892, they did relatively well in twelve counties, polling between ten and 
seventeen percent of the votes cast in each county. 6 These areas of Populist 
strength were well dispersed throughout the state: Stark County is located in 
4 .  Charles McArthur nestler, . "Consumation of a Labor-Populist 
Alliance in Illinois, 1894 , "  Mississippi Valley Historical Review, :XXVII 
(March 1941), pp. 593-94. 
5. Ibid. 
6 .  Shelby County, in east central Illinois was the most radical county, 
with 1 7 .  2 percent of the vote there going to the third party. Shelby's closest 
rival was Fayette County, where 15. 4 percent of the electorate cast radical votes. 
Surprisingly, Marion County was the exception in the group supporting the 
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north-central Illinois; Pike County i s  situated between the Illinois and 
Mississippi Rivers; Clark County is on the Wabash River at the eastern border; 
west of Clark is a large band of counties reaching south from the state's center--
Shelby, Fayette, Jefferson, Marion, Clay, and Wayne counties; at the southern 
tip of Illinois is another group of three counties--Johnson, Pope, and Hardin. 7 
However, examination of several economic and demographic characteristics 
which most of these counties shared in the Eighties and Ninties shows nothing 
unique to them alone, nothing which was not common to any other counties 
giving the Populists no significant support i n  1892. 
Population trends and characteristics do not by themselves explain the 
incidence of Populism in the twelve counties providing third party support. 
Like Illinois at large, the population i n  most of these counties was increasing 
between 1880 and 1890--albeit several of them, like Marion, Clay, Pope and 
Shelby, were growing at substantially slower paces than the state's 26. 6 percent 
growth rate. Indeed, three of the counties in question--Clark, Clay and Fayette--
showed no growth at all over the decade, and Pike and Stark counties actually 
lost people during the Eighties. However, 31 of Illinoi s '  90 non-Populist 
Populist; only 9. 1 percent of Marion's votes went to the People's Party. In Pike, 
the figure was a healthier 13 . 6 percent. For 1892 vote totals in all 102 Illinois 
counties see the Appendix at the conclusion of this paper. 
7 .  Throughout the reminder of the text, counties and townships where the 
People's Party did well--as defined by criteria outlined in Chapter 1, p. 7-­
often will be referred to as "Populist counties" or "Populist townships, "  and 
the others identified as "non-Populist" areas. These labels are for syntax' 
sake only; They are not meant necessarily to imply ahsolute comparative 
relationships in the voting strengths of the three parties. 
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counties also showed wither a population loss or no growth during that decade; 
so that factor alone obviously was not an important one in bringing out the radical . 
vote. In fact, the rapid jump in the state's population in between 1880 and 1890 
mainly was due to tremendous growth in only 13 counties, while 46 showed just 
8 moderate increases during that period. 
One demographic characteristic which does help to distinguish the twelve 
Populist counties from those with more conservative voting patterns, is the 
ethnic factor. The number of foreign-born in Illinois in 1890 was almost 850 
thousand, up over fifty percent from the 1880 figure. But in all twelve Populist 
counties the trend was reversed, and the foreign population became smaller as 
time passed. Although the number of foreign-born also was falling in 53 other 
counties, the twelve with radical political leanings are still unique because they 
illustrated highly nativistic qualities. The whole state was 21. 5 percent foreign 
in 1890. But, with the exception of Stark, no county where the People's Party 
ran well contained more than a 5. 5 percent foreign population. In fact, seven 
of the twelve had foreign populations under three percent, and a third of the 
twelve under two percent. Although 16 other counties also fell into this range, 
over half of the Populist counties ranked in the bottom third of the 38 least 
9 
foreign counties in the state. All these highly native counties, Populist and 
non-Populist, .also were highly agricultural; . 
8_ U . S. Ce.nsus Of{ice, Census Reports, Twelfth Census of the United 
States, Taken in the Year 1900, Vol. I, Population, Part I, pp. 16, 17. 
9.  U . S. Census Office, Compendium of the Eleventh Census: 1890, 
Part I -- Population, pp. 482, 483. 
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Obviously the number of farms a county contained, and their average 
size, gives some indication of its agrarian economic strength. In a county 
having no large cities to provide an industrial or commercial base--and all 
twelve counties fit this mold--such a figure assumes paramount importance. 
Farms in Illinois averaged 127 acres in 1890. Farms in ten counties showing 
some Populist strength in 1892 were considerably smaller, ranging between 
90 and 113 acres. Only Pike and Stark, the two northernmost counties did not 
fit this pattern, averaging 135 and 154 acres respectively. However, farms 
in 22 other counties not supporting the Populists also averaged between 90 and 
113 acres, or were smaller. lO Thus while all but two of the twelve ranked 
i n  the lower third of the state's 102 counties according to farm size, other 
factors must be considered to explain the presence of third party strength. 
The same is true of farm values in the Populist and non-Populist counties. 
With per capita values of $164 to $403, farms in the twelve counties showing 
Populist sympathies ranked in the lowest quarter of the state. 11 However, farms 
i n  sixteen other counties also fell in this value range. Nine of the twelve discon-
tented counties--Pike, Stark, and Marion excepted--had per acre values ranging 
between $10. 68 and $20. 46. 12 In this case, only five non-Populist counties had 
per acre values equally low; however> all five came from the sixteen conservative 
10. U . S .  Census Office, Report on the Statistics of Agriculture in the 
United States at the Eleventh Census: 1890, pp. 134-37. 
11. Again, Pike and Stark counties are the exception. Their average farm 
values were considerably higher. 
12. The per acre values for Marion, Pike, and Stark counties were 
$23. 4 7 ,  $32. 39, and $52. 05,  respectively. 
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counties sharing low per capita farm values with the Populist counties. 
Furthermore, all five also were among the 22 non-Populist counties suffering 
13 
from smaller than average farm size. 
These three characteristics--farm size, per capita farm value, and 
value per acre--provide some general idea about economic conditions i n  these 
Illinois counties in the 1880's. The size of a farm imposes limitations on how 
much can be produced and, to a lesser extent, on what can be produced profit-
ably. Such factors in turn determine the income which can be derived from a 
farm each year, and hence the living standard possible for the farmer and his 
family. "Per capita farm value" considers not only the general quality, 
improvement, and size of farms in a county, but also the number of people those 
farms must support . . This consideration is an important one, for the size of a 
county's population can mitigate the economic strain of small or poor or un-
productive farms, if that population is small, or make the problem more 
severe, if the population i s  large. The average value of an acre reflects both 
the degree of land improvement in a county and the productivity of its working 
acreage. 
Low values for any or all of these three characteristics indicate poor 
conditions and economic problems in a county. Thus, based on farm size, 
per capita farm value, and per acre land values, the twelve counties showing 
Populist strength_ in 1892 were poor agricultural areas. They ranked in the lowest 
13. Statistics of Agriculture: 1890, pp. 134-37 a�d U. S. _C ensus Office, 
Report on Wealth, Debt, and Taxation at the Eleventh Census: 1890, Part II: 
Valuation and Taxation, pp. 24-26. 
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quarter of Illinois counties in each of the measurements. But eight of the 22 
other counties sharing the problem of small farm size also shared either the 
problem of low per capita farm values or low per acre values, and five of the 
eight had all three problems in common with the more radical areas. Thus, 
while these three characteristics alone do not explain the degree to which 
twelve Illinois counties leaned toward third party politics, the increasing 
weight of a combination of adverse conditinns obviously was a factor in their 
voting behavior. Of 32 counties containing abnormally small farms, only ten 
provided significant support for the People's Party in 1892. Of 18 counties 
with small farms and either low farm values or below average values per acre, 
ten had Populist sympathies. Finally, of 14 counties suffering from problems 
in all three areas, nine--a full 84 percent--showed Populist strength. 14 
Illinois in the late nineteenth century was corn country. Like the rest 
of the state, the twelve counties giving support to the People's Party all planted 
well over half their improved acreage in corn. While in general land in the 
Populist counties was not as productive as the state average of 36. 8 bushels 
per acre, no great production gap existed except for Clay, Fayette and Marion 
counties, which averaged 24. 9, 23 . 1 ,  ancl 26. 4 bushels per acre, respectively. 
One Populist county even had a production rate well above the state average; 
Stark County farms produced 42 . 7 bushels of corn per acre. The same 
situation exists for wheat and oats, Illinois' other major cereal crops. Although 
the Populist counties showed less inclination to plant wheat than di d  most other 
14. Statistics of Agriculture: 1 890, pp. 134-37 and U . S. Census Office, 
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counties in Illinois, and although their wheat and oat production was not as 
good as in many other areas, several non-Populist counties exhibited the 
15 
same characteristics. 
If other counties were comprised of equally small, poor, unproductive 
farms--if other counties had the same general demographic make-up--how 
can the existance of Populism in these twelve counties be explained? A 
possible answer might be the one already suggested--that no one or two 
demographic or economic conditions by themselves motivated a large Populist 
vote in 1892. The twelve Populist counties consistantly ranked at or near 
the bottom in several critical measurements; a combination of unfavorable 
circumstances--each shared with some non-Populist counties, but with 
substantially different ones each time--marked these twelve as uniquely 
unfortunate areas. A few non-Populist counties exhibited the same combination 
of characteristics as the Populist ones. However, each time another unfavorable 
circumstance was added to those already affecting the group of depressed 
Illinois counties, more non-Populist counties were eliminated from the list 
of those areas suffering .. from that totality of conditions. But in the end, at 
least five non-Populist counties remained, in the same general economic 
circumstances as the counties showing significant support for the third party 
in 1892. 
Report on Wealth, Debt, and Taxation at the Eleventh Census: 1890, Part II: 
Valuation and Taxation, pp. 24-26, and Official Vote of the State of Illinois 
in 1892, pp . . 1 .  2 .  
15. Statistics of Agriculture: 1890, pp. 362, 363. 
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A better explanation for Populist strength might be that no extreme 
county-wide discrepancy in conditions or circumstances existed as a reason 
for third party voting. A county is so large a civil unit that it might mask 
great internal variations. Within two counties appearing to be demographically 
and economically similar, an area or areas might be substantially different 
from others in the s ame county, or from areas in the second county. Thus 
internal differences might explain why the People's Party did well in one 
county i n  1892, but not in another county with seemingly identical characteristics. 
Perhaps Marion and Pike counties, the subjects of the next two chapters, 
are the best examples of how examination of only county-level characteristics 
can hide internal conditions. If the 1892 election results were not available 
for Pike County, one would hardly expect to group it with the other counties 
showing Populist strength. Pike was the exception to the rule for almost every 
condition the Populist counties had in common. Its farms were larger than 
the state average. Its land was as productive as its per acre and per capita 
values were high. By all these measures, 13. 6 percent of Pike County males 
should not have cast third party votes in 1892. However, closer examination 
of conditions in Pike shows that not all townships within the county were uniformly 
blessed by prosperity. Nor was the Populist vote evenly distributed through'out 
the county. Support for the People's Party came from six townships; residents 
of the other eighteen did not vote the Populist ticket to nearly the same degree. 
Thus, the general conditions in Pike County are deceiving. An enclave of 
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hard-core radicalism existed in the southeastern townships, and study must 
1 6  
descend to the township level to uncover it. 
Marion County was the exact opposite of Pike. While Pike farms were 
larger than the state average, Marion farms were smaller. While Pike land 
was productive, Marion County land was not. Indeed, while Pike County 
generally was the exception to the conditions the Populist counties seemingly 
had in common, Marion typified them. Poor, unproductive and highly native, 
Marion fit well with Fayette, Clark, Clay, Jefferson, and all the other counties 
where the Populists did relatively well in 1892. But strangely, the People's 
Party there showed less vitality than it did in untypical Pike County. The 
Populists in Marion polled less than the ten percent minimum established to 
17 
catagorize an area as a "Populist" county. Yet it had to be included in 
this study because it was one of only three counties in Illinois where the 
Populists actually carried townships. Thus, i n  this case also, differences in 
internal conditions seem to distinguish one county from another appearing 
in the same general circumstances. Otherwise, how does one explain the 
existance of Populist townships in Marion County but not i n  Edwards County, 
for example ,  where the People's Party won just 2 .  4 percent of the vote ? 
Point for point, Edwards County equals Marion County i n  the ge.neral conditions 
identified as common to the Populist counties--farm size, per capita farm 
values, land values per acre, ethnicity of population, and others . Why did 
1 6 .  Statistics. of Agriculture: 1890, pp. 134, 135, 205, and 363; ·wealth , 
Debt, and Taxation: 1890, p. 25; and Pike County Democrat, November 16, 1892. 
17. Statistics of Agriculture: 1890, pp. 134, 135, 205, and 363; Wealth , 
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some counties give over ten percent of their votes to the People's Party i n  
1892 while other counties exhibiting similar circumstances did not? Why 
did some to\vnships i.n Marion County go into the third party column tn 1892, 
while those in nine of the other Populist counties did not ? Why did some areas 
in Marion County vote for the Populilsts while other townships i n  the same 
county give them no support? If an attempt is to be made to answer these 
questions, a township-level study is needed. 
The folbwing two chapters provide a grassroots study of two of the 
three counties where the Populists c arried townships in 1892. 1 8 Both 
chapters examine conditions in the most politically partisan townships where 
each party achieved its greatest percentage of the votes. 19 For simplicity 
and clarity sake they are identified here: In Marion County the Populists carried 
only one township, Raccoon, and ran ahead of a major party in another, Meacham. 
Haines Township as also studied as an area of Populist strength because the 
radicals fell only three votes short of equalipg the Republican total. C arrigan 
is the most Republican township, and Tonti the most Democratic.  In Pike 
County the Populist townships are Pearl, Hardin, and Montezuma; but strong 
Populist undercurrents existed in Newburg and Spring Creek. Detroit is the 
Democratic township and Martinsburg the Republican one . 
Debt, and Taxation: 1890, p. 25; and Marion County Democrat, November 18, 1892. 
1 8. As noted in Chapter 1, a study of the third county, Shelby, is not 
possible because the necessary tax records have been destroyed. 
19. The process for selecting the subject townships is detailed in Chapter 1, 
pp. 6, 7. 
CHAPTER V 
Agrarian Discontent in M arion County, Illinois 
Marion County is a flat area in the heart of southern Illinois. Twenty-
four miles square, the county is composed of sixteen townships, each containing 
23, 040 acres . Marion was originally the nothern part of Jefferson. County, 
but in 1823 it was granted autonomy and named after the Revolutionary War 
1 
hero, Francis Marion. 
The first settler in what became Marion County arrived with his son from 
Shawneetown, Illinors in 1813. They were joined a year later by a settler from 
Tennessee, and subsequently by others from Tennessee, Kentucky, and Virginia .  
Despite this promising beginning, only 1040 of the county's 368, 640 acres were 
in private hands by 1824, although some squatters existed on the public domain. 
In 1825, a special census showed just 527 persons living in Marion County; but 
the economic direction of the area already was established. Of 117 adult males, 
· 116 were farmers and o�e was a blacksmith. 2 The county grew quickly after 
obtaining autonomy. By the 1830 census the population quadrupled to 2125. It 
doubled to 4,  742 during the next ten years. Between 1850 and 1860 it doubled 
3 to 4 ,  720 to 12, 739. 
1 .  See map on p .  5 0  to locate Marion County. 
2.  J. H. G, Brinkerhoff, Brinkerhoff's 'History of Marion County, Illinois 
(Indianapolis: B .  F. Bowen and Co. , 190�) • . pp. 40 , 41. 
3. Twelfth Census, Population, Part I, p. 16.  
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A significant event in the county's growth occurred in 1852, when land 
was granted to the Illinois Central Railroad. The railroad's arrival precipitated 
a scramble for landholdings i n  Marion County. When the railroad grants were 
made, only 105, 000 acres, less than one-third of the county's total, were 
privately owned. However, by 1865 all public land in Marion County had 
vanished. Thus, while the population of the county was doubling, the amount of 
private landholding increased threefold. 4 
Marion County gave little support to the nation's war efforts in the 
mid-nineteenth century. Only 41 men responded to a call for troops to ftght 
the Blackhawk War in 1832. This lack of public support probably was because 
the people of Marion County were not intimidated by a military threat so far to 
the north. During the Civil War the county sent 1516 men to fight, although 
unlike the larger and more populous Pike County, they raised no local regiment. 
Also, it is noteworthy that less than ten percent of Civil War veterans from 
5 
Marion County were volunteers. 
After the war Marion County veterans returned to farming, although not 
on what could be called a spectacular scale. In fact, agricultural statistics for 
the county help explain the agrarian unrest there during the Eighties and Nineties. 
I n  1890, only 37 of Illinois 102 counties had more farms than did Marion County. 
Yet 63 of them possessed a greater number of improved acres. Furthermore, 
4. Brinkerhoff, History of Marion County, pp. 54, 55. 
5. Ibid. ' p. 51. . 
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although local farmers spent $3, 672 on fertilizer in that year, the fourth 
highest amount in the state, the county ranked eighteenth from the bottom in 
6 
farm production. 
The major crop in Marion County was corn, the premier crop in Illinois 
in 1890 . Yet fertilization notwithstanding, the county's corn production was 
dismally low. The 50, 070 acres of Marion County planted in corn in 1890, 
produced an average of 26. 4 bushels per acre. Not only was this figure well 
under the state average of 38.  1 bushels, but only five counties experienced 
poorer corn production; in fact, eight Illinois counties planted fewer acres of 
corn but had a higher total yield than did Marion. The same is true of oats, 
Illinois' second important crop. State production averaged 36. 5 bushels per 
acre. But with a rate of 24. 8 bushel� per acre, Marion County was also one 
of the poorest oat-producing areas in. the state . . Since corn and oats were the 
two major crops in Marion County too, economic conditions there were highly 
unsa,tisfactory. 7 
Certainly many Marion County farmers must have felt the same way about 
the condition of agriculture as did the county's most famous product, William 
Jennings Bryan. Born in Salem in 1860, Bryan remained in Marion County 
until 1874, when he moved north to Jacksonville, Illinois. Furthermore, by 
living in Jacksonville until 1887, Bryan was well able to keep in touch with 
relatives in Marion County and as conditions deteriorated there, and around 
Jacksonville, Brya� 's  political philosophy likely was established. 8 
6. ·Statlstics of Agriculture: 1890, pp. 204-06. 
7. Ibid. , pp. 362, 363. 
8. Brinkerhoff, History of Marion County, pp. 215,  216.  
G3 
In 1890 and 1 8 9 1 ,  western Marion County was plagued by a series of  
barn burnings ultimately traced to a Sandoval farmer named McKibbon. The 
press characterized this individual as a bright but misguided man influenced 
by radical literature. Brooding over the unequal distribution of wealth in the 
county, he finally acted to bring equality. McKibbon gathered together a group 
of young men holding similar views and over several months spread havoc and 
terror throughout the county. He was eventually betrayed by one of his followers 
and captured in the process of  blowing up a store. Brought to trial, McKibbon 
was convicted and fined five hundred dollars. He remained in. jail until his fine 
. 
9 
was paid by relatives, whereupon he was released and left the county for good. 
' 
Although McKibbon stood trial and was punished for only his criminal 
acts, the social ideas he espoused also were unpopular in Marion County, at 
least among its more prosperous citizens. In Salem, the local press of both 
major parties seemed to sense the potential grassroots strength of a radical 
political movement in the area. At first they ignored the third party, but as 
Populist support grew in the outlying townships, bot the Republican and Democratic 
newspapers abandoned this tactic and lashed out at the radicals. The Republicans 
confined their attack to Populist vice-presidential candidate James Field, reporting 
he regretted not having killed more Union solders during the Civil War. 
lO 
Perhaps 
fearing they had more to lose, the Democrats' attack on the radicals was vigor-
ous and continual. The party's press reported that Populists were of two types , 
2. Brinkerhoff, History of Marion County, p. 187. 
10. Marion County Republican, September '8, 1892. 
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"broken-down, dissappointed, discouraged, old men . . . (and] young men, 
who are below the average of intellegence and of no standing in their commu.n-
ities , "  Faithful Democrats were warned that Populist sentiments were generally 
not praiseworthy and that the entire movement bordered on being revolutionary .1 1  
The course of the general election i n  Marion County was established by 
the township contests held in April, 1892. In the majority of the townships, 
Democratic candidates were successful. But in Carrigan Tavship, where both 
an independent slate and a 11peoplers11  ticket also were on the ballot, the 
independent candidates were elected. The only other local contest involving a 
Populist effort was in Raccoon Township where the FMBA backed a victorious 
third party slate. 12 As local radicals began to formulate a county slate for -
the general election, Marion Democrats increasingly became concerned a split 
in their ranks would ultimately help the Republicans and they commenced an 
active campaign in the press against this threat. The party organ in the county 
admonished potential deserters by stating: 
It seems to us very much out of place for certain Democrats ( ?) 
to assert that they will not vote for certain individuals should 
they succeed in obtaining the Democratic nominations . . .  after 
the majority of Democrats after the nomination have been made, · 
[wn!J heartily support the ticket. We know no other Democracy. 1 3  
Fearing the Populist movement would hurt their entire candidate slate, 
Democrats struck hard at the dangers of defecting from the ticket: 
1 1 .  Marion County Democrat, July 8, 1892.  
12. Ibid. , April 9,  1892, and Marion County Republican, March 10, 1892. 
13. Marion County Democrat, April 1 8 ,  1892. 
Our Republican friends, of this County, are hoping that there 
will be sufficient dissensions among the Democrats, enough . 
bolters to enable them to defeat a portion of the Democratic 
ticket. Their hopes are i n  vain, for, with but few exceptions, 
individual De_ruocrats of this County will present a solid and 
united frorit. 
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However, these fears proved unjustified . and grandiose rhetoric was 
unnecessary. Although the Populists fielded a county ticket i n  June, they had 
no central committee nor any county-wide organization. Their county 
convention attracted only about forty persons. . Furthermore, the results of 
the general election, held November 8, 1892, were not altered by the presence 
of a third party on the ballot. The entire Democratic county slate was elected, 
although the Populists carried Raccoon Township and made significant inroads 
in Haines Township. In Meacham Township the Populists finished second to 
the Democrats but ahead of the Republican candidates. In Carrigan Township 
the Populists ran poorly but lured away enough Democratic votes to deliver the 
township: to the Republicans. 15 Table 3 shows the vote distribution fol.' the 
townships being studied in the presidential election of 1892. Since straight-
ticket voting was common during that period, the totals for state and county 
candidates of each party varied only slightly, if at all, from the votes cast 
for the presidential contenders. 
Figure 2 illustrates that the third party vote in Marion County did not 
come from any enclave of hard-core discontented, agrarian radicals. Instead, 
the areas showing significant Populist strength were well-dispersed throughout 
14. Marion County Democrat, May 6, 1892. 
15. Ibid. , November 18, 1892. 
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the county. Raccoon and Haines townships are located in the south-central 
portion of Marion County, and Meacham is in the extreme northeast corner. 
Not surprisingly, the radical activities of McKibbon in 1890 and 1891 likely 
. � . ' 
contributed to the poor Populist showing the the western townships. 
Voting patterns in the five Marion County townships generally seem to 
verify the hypothesis advanced earlier that tenant farmers might be less 
susceptible to radical agrarian movements than landowners because they had 
fewer roots and were less likely to stand and fight against unfavorable conditions. 16 
According to the theory, during depression the proportion of landowners in areas 
showing tendencies toward radical politics might be higher than in more politically 
stable ones, where high tenancy rates would be expected. Although the relationship 
16. See Chapter ID ,  pp. 38, 39. 
FIGURE 2 
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bet\veen land ownership and politic
.
al unrest is not a perfect one, Table 4 shows 
a strong general association between these two variables. · In the three strong 
Populist townships--Meacham, Raccoon, and Haines--the lanholding rates 
were relatively high, since almost half the residents owned the land they . 
farmed. Furthermore, i n  stable Carrigan Township ,  where the People's Party 
polled only seventeen of the 166 votes cast in the general election, the 
ownership rate was a very low 34. 1 percent, while 65. 9 percent of the family 
heads were tenants. 
Ti\BLE 1 
PERCENT .AGE OF LANDOW�lN'G RESIDENTS COMPAHED TO 
THE PERCENT AGE OF LAI\'"D THEY OWNED IN SELECTED 
· TOWNSHIPS OF l\lARION, COUNTY, ILUNOIS, IN is92 
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Township Residents Owning Land Lancl Owned by Residents' 
-· 
C arrigan 
Haines 
Mench am 
Raccoon 
Tonti 
Source: 
-
i 
34. 1 40 . 2  
42 . 2  54. 7 
46. 8 44. 2 
46. 1 51. 2 
42. 8 42. 5 
Assessor's Books for Carrigan, Haines, Meacham, and 
Tonti townships for 1892, and Raccoon Township for 1891. 
However, while general tenancy trends in Marion County support the 
theory of correlatio n  between landholding and radical agrarian politics, in Tonti 
Township, where the Populi�ts fared most poorly in 1892, the percentage of 
landowning residents was about the same as in Haines; where the p·arty came 
within three votes of equalling the Republicans. Thus, although ranking the 
townships by amount of resident land ownership and by degree of Populist 
strength produces fairly positive relationships, the association between land-
ownership and political behavior is not strong enough to equate radical politics 
to that factor alone. Obviously, additional forces also motivated farmers in 
some townships to cast large numbers of votes for Populist candidates, while 
i n  others the residents were not similarly affected. 
Another factor weakening the potential value of any strong positive 
association between Populism and landowning is the probability that not all 
69 
persons . seeming to be without real property actually were tenant farmers. 
From available information, the total number of tenants in a township must 
be determined by subtracting the people owning both land and personal property, 
as recorded in the county tax books, from its entire list of personal property 
holders. However, i f  this remainder was all tenant farmers, the. tenancy rates 
for the townships studied would vary between 53. 1 and 65. 9 percent, figures 
. 17 
unbelievably high when compared to the county average of 25 percent. Most 
likely, some persons who might otherwise be classed as tenant farmers in a 
township actually owned and worked land in neighboring townships. Such instances 
would be particularly expected in cases where those residents lived near 
township borders. Other tenants may not have been farmers at all, but instead 
farm laborers or persons engaged in agriculturally-related occupations. Thus, 
determining the number of tenant farmers in a township is a high speculative 
operation, but one which affects calculation of the percentage of resident land-
owners--from which the theory equating landownership and radical politics 
is drawn. 
While a direct link cannot be drawn between real estate and support for 
the Peoples' party in the varirus townships, the figures in Table 4 and their 
attendent interpretation problems do not affect the actual distribution of 
property within each township. Again a general tendency exists, but certainly 
not a perfect association. The table shows that in two of the Populist townships, 
Hai.nes and Raccoon, landowning residents possessed more than their arithmetic 
17. Statistics of Agriculture: 1 890, pp. 134, 135. 
7 0  
equal share of the acreage and crowded the tenants, a majority of the elect­
orate in each case, onto a disproportionately small amount of land. However, 
in  C arrigan Township, where Populist candidates ran poorly, the identical 
situation existed because only 34 percent of the citizens owned 40 percent of 
the land. In the Populist stronghold of Meacham most of the property \Vas 
held by absentee owners. Thus, McKibbon 's activities notwithstanding, the 
hypothesis that inequality in the distribution of property might have bred 
discontent at ·the polls meets the same fate as the theory t.hat equates radical 
politics and landowning; the relationship is not strong enough to stand alone 
as an explanation for Populist electoral fortunes. 
Other v�riables in man-land relationships in the townships studied are 
detailed in Table 5. The table indicates that no good relationship exists 
between resident farm size or improved acreage and Populist strength in  the 
five townships. Resident landowners in Carrigan and Tonti, where the 
People's Party did most poorly in 1892, had the largest and the second-smallest 
farms, respectively, the largest and smallest number of improved acres, 
and the greatest and smallest percentage of improved land. However, Table 5 
does illustrate a strong and clear-cut relationship between Populism and agrarian 
conditions in Marion County. A direct association exists between Populist 
strength and land values on the township level. Even though the farms of Tonti 
landowners were the second-smallest of the· townships studied, their values were 
the second-highest. Furthermore, although the average Tonti resident's farm 
was the least improved, the per acre value for all his land, improved and 
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unimproved, was the highest of ··an five townships. Carrigan farm3 did 
have a higher percentage of improved acreage than farms i n  the Populist 
townships. But this advantage does not completely account for the higher 
. . 
. 
land values in Carrigan. For example, although Carrigan farms were seven 
percent more improved than those in Meacham Township, land on Carrigan farms 
was worth eleven percent per acre more than Meacham land. Thus only two-
thirds of their difference i n  value can be attributed to the higher percentage 
of improved acreage on Carrigan farms; the other four percent difference was 
due to the higher quality of improved land in Carrigan Township. · These facts 
mean that even though landowning farmers in the three Populist Townships 
generally worked a greater number and percentage of improved acres, their 
farms were worth less than farms i n  the two townships where the People's 
Party did poorly in the 1892 elections. 
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The relationship between land worth and Populism i s  further illustrated 
by Table 6, which details the value of land held by nonresident landowners and 
worked by tenants. At first glance, the figures listed below might give the 
TABLE 6 
PERCENTAGE OF LAND IN SELECTED TOWNSfilPS OF MARION 
COUNTY OWNED BY NON-RESIDENTS, PERCENTAGE OF THEIR 
LAND WHICH WAS IMPROVED, AND ITS VALUE I N  1892. 
-·----
t l
_
TownshlJJ 
l 
Land 
I111p1·oved 
Value 
Per Acre 
Currigan 
Hai.nes 
Meacham 
Raccoon 
Tonti 
11 8.  8 
5 7 .  !j 
68. 2 $5. 02 
62. 6 4 . 03 
71. 2 G. 0 7  
61.  2 3 . 87 
63. 7 4. 88 
Source: Ass0ssor ' s  Dooks for Carrignn, Ifoincs, Meachnm, 
and Tonti townshi.ps in 1892, and for Raccoon 
Township in 1891.  
impression that Meacham Township, an area of Populist strength, does not fit 
the general pattern established by Table 5 for equating land values and radical 
politics. However, as in Carrigan Township in the previous table, the high per 
acre value of Meacham's nonresident real estate i s  due more to a disproportionate 
amount of improved land than to its quality. If the same correction factor just 
used for Carrigan Township in the previous table is applied to Meacham land 
values, the worth of nonresident landholdings there drops from $5. 07 to $4. 42 
per acre, well below land values i n  townships where the Populists. showed no 
strength. Thus Meacham Township also fits the relationship established 
between the value of both resident and nonresident, or tenant, landholdings 
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and radical agrarian politics. A ranking of all acreage by worth in the townships 
being studied shows the nonradical Carrigan and Tonti townships �t the top of 
the list with equally high land values of $5. 28 per acre. Well below those 
two townships, the three acres of Populist strength--Haines, Meacham, and 
Raccoon townships--had average per acre values of $4. 07,  $5. 07 and. $4 . 28 
respectively. 
Tables 5 and 6,  and the explanatory material accompanying them, 
establish on township level the same general relationship between Populist 
strength and low agricultural production cited earlier in this chapter for all 
Marion County. 18 The only plausible explanation why land i n  townships having 
a high percentage of improved acres would be worth less than real estate in 
nearby townships with a lower percentage of working acreage is· that the improved 
land in the former townships was poor, and hence probably less productive, 
than land in the latter ones. Not only did the Populists show strength in Marion 
County, one of the poorest producing areas in the state of Illinois, but within 
the county the strong Populist townships also very likely were areas of low 
production, a factor which drove down their land values. On the other hand, 
the townships with higher average land values, and with sometimes fewer but 
more fertile ·acres in production, gave almost no support to the People's Party 
in the 1892 election. Thus a strong connection may be established between low 
production and poor land, and radical agrarian politics, at le�st i n  Marion 
County. No matter whether .. thei:z::.f.arms were larger or smaller than farms of 
18. See pp. 61, 62. 
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other townships, no matter whether a greater or lesser proportion of their 
farms were actively in production, in the townships showing Populist strength, 
farmers worked poorer and less productive lands than did their more prosperous 
and fortunate neighbors. This inequity in production well could have made 
farmers in the three disadvantaged townships extra-sensitive to agrarian conditions--
a sensitivity manifested a t  the polls in November, 1892, by lnrge numbers of 
votes for a radical agrarian party. 
The lmv agricultural productivity in Haines, Meacham, and Raccoon town-
ships, all areas where the Populists did well in the general election, was due to 
rudimentary farming techniques. Indeed, the relative degree of mechanization 
in the five townships was analogous to the fertilizer situation in the entire 
county. Just as Marion County was among the most heavily fertilized but 
poorly productive areas in the state, within the county the poorly productive 
Populist townships tended to be more highly mechanized than those townships 
where the third party did not do well. Table 7 detail$ this trend by showing a 
markedly higher degree of farm mechanization in the townships providing 
1 9  
support for the Populists i n  the election of 1892. 
In Carrigan and Tonti townships, where the Populists had no electoral 
success, the average value of machinery on each farm was significantly less 
19. The terms "machinery" and "mechanization" are used advisedly in 
this context. They refer to a wide variety of implements and devices. Some 
of the more sophisticated and modern machines developed in the Seventies and 
Eighties and commonly in use in 1892 include: drills and broadcast seeders to 
mechanize planting, cultivators and fertilizing machines, and harvesting devices 
such as reapers, binders, threshers, and rakes. A concise yet excellent 
discussion of agricultural mechanization during the late nineteenth century i s  
D.f�Grn::s OF i\GHICU L'['Ul\ .:\ L i»lP.CH/ .. �!TZ Ni10.N s�.10NG 
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Sc,urcc: Assessor's Bo0ks for Cnrri��:in, Haines, l\-ie:ich<im, ar.d Tonti 
Townships in 1892, and fv1· Raccoon Township in 1891. 
than in those townships giving support to.,the third party movement. Furthermore, 
almost one·-fourth to one-half of the farmers in the non-Populist townships 
reported no machinery at all on their farms. Among the more radical townships, 
only Raccoon, where a sixth of the farms had no machinery, even approaches 
this level of unmechanized agriculture. 
It must be noted at this point that Table 7 only concerns machinery 
possessed by resident landowning farmers. No accurate method exists for 
determining how many of the townships' tenants actually farmed--although 
it probably was a high percentage. But if the hypothesis that a strong positive 
relationship exists between farm ownership and radical agrarian politics is 
found in Shannon, Farmers' Last Frontier, pp. 125-46. 
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a correct one, then measurement of mechanization oh tenants' farms is of less 
importance anyv1ay. Indeed, analysis of mechanization using all adult males 
--tenants and landowners both--in the five townships as the subject population, 
produces nearly the same results as Table 7 .  Although the differences between 
the townships' mechanization levels are less marked, only Carrigan Township, 
where two-thirds of the residents were tenants--the highest tenancy rate in the 
five townships--fails to fit the pattern of high mechanization and radical politics 
established in Table 7. This relationship is elaborated by Table 8, which takes 
int.o account the average size of each township's landholdings in determining 
its relative degree of mechanization. Introduction of the farm size variable 
makes even greater the difference between mechanization in the politically 
moderate townships and in the radical ones. 
TABLE 8 
VALUE OF AGRICULTURAL MACHINEHY AND IMPLEMENTS PER 
IMPROVED ACRE OF LA:t\1D OWNED Al\TD FARMED BY RESIDENTS 
I N  SELECTED TOWNSHIPS OF MARIO;N COUNTY, ILIJNOIS ·" .I N  1892. 
Township 
Carrigan 
Haines 
Meacham 
Raccoon 
Tonti 
SoL1rce: 
Average Improved Average Value of Value Per 
Fa.rm Size Acreage Farm Implements Improved Acre 
132. 5 110. 3 $3. 09 $0 . 028 
115. 5 80. 2 4 . 44 . 055 
104. 5 79. 7 8. 68 . 109 
88. 0 63. 9 4. 48 . 070 
95. 1 63. 7 2 . 80 • 047 
Assessor's Boo!(S for Carrigan, Haines, Meacham and Tonti 
townships for 1892, and Raccoon Township for 1891. 
rr11 
i 
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Not only· was land in the three Populist townships considerably inferior 
to working acreage in Carrigan and Tonti township�, where the Populists did 
poorly in the 1892 election, but Tables 7 and 8 shows the discontented areas were 
much more highly mechanized. That their land did not produce well, despite 
the use of costly implements, must have been an additional i rritant to the 
discontented farmers of Haines, Meacham, and Raccoon townships. 
Although strong relations-hips may be drawn between radical agrarian 
politics, unfertile and poorly productive land, and high levels of mechanization, 
no such association exists with the personal property wealth of the five townships, 
as Table 9 illustrates. Personal property includes all livestock, farm implements:. 
TABLE 9 
PERSONAL PROPE: t rfY HOLDI NGS IN S8 T..EC'!".8D TOWNS!I!PS 
O F  MAHION COUNTY FOH l$92 
-
r- I � I � I 
I Township 
Carrigan 
j Hnines 
j:\reacham 
' Hac".:oon jT011ti 
I 
.<\verag0 .V�lue of Total Val9e of � :Number of 
Personal Property · J\dult Males- 1 Personal Property 
$21 , 229 194 $109 
3 1 , 32,1 251 125 
22, 938 198 115 
24 , 71 8  284 G7 
2 5 , 8�4 ' 225 115 
. }faving no 
Personal Property 
48 
18 
10 
30 
. 10 
Sm�rce: Assessor's Books for C:lrri.ga11, Haines, 1V1.;)achnm, nnd Tonti 
townships for 1892, an<l for Raccoon Townsh�p for 1891, and . 
' 'Aggreg3te Population By l\'.Iinor Ct·::il Divisions, "  Co�1pendi� 
cf the 8lcventh Cen!.ius: 1S90,  P3rt I--Porml�1t£on, p. 122. 
i 
) 
• 
I 
I 
7 8  
money, stocks and credits, merchandise or grain investories, and household 
furnishings ; it is the best available indicator of the general living standard 
in an area. The table shows that, with the notable exception of Raccoon, 
all townships were about equal according to this mc�surement. The case of 
Raccoon Township i s  unique because of the three Populist areas being studied, 
it is the only one where Populi$t strength actually exceeded the popularity of 
both major parties. The general poverty of this township well may have been 
the additional factor needed to push a poorly productive, yet highly mechanized 
and highly discontented area into the People's Party column i n  the election of 1892. 
Populist historians, mainly studying the western phase of the movement, 
claim the most fruitful areas for the radical agrarian movement were those 
places hardest hit by declining agricultural conditions in the 1880's. 20 
Table 10 shows that for Marion County, Illinois at least, this theory must be 
modified. A general decline indeed did occur in the five townships, in 
several economic areas during the Eighties. But in none of the oategoi'ies 
detailed in the table were declines in Populist townships significantly more 
21 
marked than in the more politically moderate townships. However, support 
for the theory that areas suffering the greatest agricultural collapse were also 
of strongest political radicalism can be found in the first column of the table. 
20. Hicks, Populist Revolt, pp. 31-35, 254-64. 
21. ·The percentages in this table were calculated by using the 1879 figures 
as the basis, and by measuring the amount of growth or decline, over time, 
from that point. The change was then recorded as a percent of the 1879 base 
figure. 
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r---·-- ,�-:-��l ! l-�- e�-i J:-- -· ··--· --1-------- 1 J ' }.�Lt�1bcr Cb i:i1[�cs in Vutuc 
I '1--11-np-,o:or1f ___ _ _  T T-- -�-f1 ··1-T�to1-i l Township '. ,�Cl'C'1);e I Livcotc,Jk I r,rochincry i Livestcck • Furnlshlt!�;s I Value l 
i C m--r-igu� I +1 1 .  :-1---0-'. GI -50 . 8 .._ __ -2---1 ��,-=,14. :- 1=28- 0. 1 
I II nines . � + 1 9 .  6 + 1 .  G -64. O -26. 2 i . ..:..74_ 5 , -28. 7 
i �Ieacl1am +13 . 1 - 5. 9 -3LL 2 -41 . 1 f · -33. G -35 . 2 l �=��loon :1�: � :2�: ! =��: � =;�: � I =!�: ! I =��: � I 
Honrce: Assessor's B0oks for C<irrit;Dn, Ivie3cham, Haccoon, am.l Tonti 
townBhips for 1879 <:ind H�ines Township for �S78; and C:H·rig3n, 
Hninos, Meachnm, and Tonti townships for 1892, :md l1�1cG00n 
T-ownship for 1891. 
Although economic conditions were on the decline, Marion County 
agriculture was in the midst of a period of expansion--most rapidly in the 
three Populist towiships. Agricultural expansion usually was done on borrowed 
money. · Thus expanding areas, especially where growth may not be pratical 
or wise, were most sensitive to an economic contraction. The financial 
activities of the Davenports during this period--along with their foreclosures 
as hard times struck--clearly illustrate this principle. 22 Since crop prices 
were steadily falling, farmers had difficulty not only in making loan payments, 
22. See Chapter. ID, . pp. 35, 36. 
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but even in recovering their production costs. This situation required that they 
often borrow money to meet the daily expenses of farming. As conditions got 
worse after 1887, sources of conventional loans dried up and farmers were 
forced to resort to high interest chattel mortgages on farm implements and 
home furnishings to acquire operating capital or to obtain �oney for expansion. 23 
This financial arrangement especially was likely in a heavily-settled aren such 
as Marion County, where expansion seldom meant acquisition of new land, but 
more often placing property already owned info production. Unless the farmer 
with a mind to expand acquired his new land from a neighbor's unimproved acreage; 
or unless he had paid off hi.s own farm to a point where a second mortgage was 
possible, a chattel mortgage was the only answer, except for a loan against 
his crop. The tenant farmer, with only his crop or his personal property as 
collateral, had even fewer alternatives. But in · any case, if the land did not 
produce well, or if agricultural prices fell sharply, or both, the heavily 
indebted farmer suffered severely. Such events well may explain the sharp 
drops in personal property holdings shown by Table 10. 
For the farmers of Haines, Meacham, and Raccoon townships the outlook 
must have been especially discouraging. Faced with the twin problems of 
poor land and low prices for their crops, they tried to keep their heads above 
water financially by placing more acreage into production and by investing i n  
farm machinery to a greater extent than their neighbors. More frequently 
actual owners of the land they worked than were their compatriots in nearby 
23. Farmer, "Economic Background of Frontier Populism, " p. 419. 
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townships, they were less able to pick up stakes and move on when hard 
times hit. Their expansion plans were borne of desperation. Their backs 
were to the wall. Circumstances had to be changed; conditions had to get 
better. Otherwise, these farmers would fall continually deeper into debt. 
Such farmers had a greater than normal interest in altering the status quo--
economically, socially, and politically--even to the point of supporting radical 
proposals. 
Thts , as in the West, radical agrarian discontent in Marion County 
grew strongest in areas of marginal agricultural value, and where farmers 
were caught in unsound expansion when agriculture collapsed in the mid-
Eighties. The Populists of Marion County lived in townships where poor soil 
meant low productivity, despite the farmers' attempts to change their situation. 
These factors, coupled with the collapse of the rural economy while they were 
i n  the process of expanding to increase production--and with what must have 
been mounting frustration about the distant and impersonal forces that under-
mined and negated their continuing efforts at self-help--proved catalytic, and 
long-smouldering discontent about agrarian conditions changed into open and 
concerted political protest in the election of 1892. 
CHAPTER VI 
Radical Politics i n  Pike County, Illinois 
The People's Party showed considerably more strength in Pike County 
than it did in Marion. The 13. 9 percent of the Pike vote captured by the Populists 
was much better than their 9 . 1 percent success in the southern county. In 
addition, while the Populists made a s i gnificant showing in only three Marion 
County townships, they did well in seven townships of Pike County. However, 
these were not the only differences between the two counties; they differed in 
1 
several other ways. Containing s ixteen incorporated towns and thirty-one · 
villages, Pike County in 1892 was considerably larger and mor e developed 
than its . southern counterpart. Pikers twenty-four townships numbered half-
again as many· as in Marion, and the county's 756 square miles gave it a total 
2 land area 31 percent larger. 
Located on Illinois' western border about a hundred miles due north of 
St. Louis, Pike is a r�ver county; more than a fifth of its total area is in the 
fertile valley formed by the Mississippi River, which marks its western boundry. 
Pike's other side is extremely poor, hilly, and bro ken country, culminating in 
a high bluff running the length of its eastern border, the Illinois River. 3 The 
geographic features of the county played a significant role in its development. 
1 .  Official Vote of the State of Illinois in 1892, pp. 1,  2 .  
2.  M. D. Massie, Past and Present of Pike County, Illinois (Chicago: 
S .  J. Clarke Publishing Compnny, 1966), p. 34. 
3. Ibid. 
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The area was considerably less isolated than lVIarion County. Its river 
83 
borders provided easy access for moving people and produce north to Chicago 
or south to St. Louis. However, the geography of the county also presented 
some drawbacks. The presence of good, fertile bottomland in its western 
townships and of rugged, heavily-timbered countryside on its eastern border, 
created a discrepancy in conditions which registered quite graphically in the 
election of 1892. 
Most of Pike County pioneers established residence in the more promising 
western sections of the county. But despite the fertile land that area had to 
offer, permanent settlement in the county occurred relatively late. The first 
families arrived from Massachusetts in 1820 and settled in what became Atlas 
Township, in the southwest· section of the present county. As the southwest 
quickly filled, later arrivals chose more central locations. Thls shift in 
settlement patterns was recognized in 1833 when the county seat moved from 
Atlas to Pittsfield, the fastest growi.ng village in the area. 4 
Pike County originally was tremendous i n  size. Established in 1821 · 
as a Military Tract for veterans of the War of 1812, the county at first extended 
eastward along the Kankakee River to the Indiana line, and so far north that 
when the county's first election was held, the thirty-five votes cast included 
"those of the French at Chicago. " But large portions of land were cut off 
by the Illinois legislature in 1823 and again in 1825. Eventually, fifty counties 
4. M. D. ;Mass.ie, Past and Present of Pike County, Illinois, p. 51, and 
History of Pike County, Illinois (Chicago: Charles C .  Chapman and Company, 
1880), pp. 265-69. 
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were organized from the land separated from Pike. Bitter controversy 
dominated Pike County in 1847, when the Illinois Constitution cal1ed for 
township organization. But an election held in 1849 approved an organization 
5 
plan, and in 1850 the county adopted the civil structure it has tod3.y. 
Like its southern counterpart, Pike County was named after a noted 
historical figure--thc famous explorer, Captain Z ebulon Pike. At first, life 
in Pike was much more uncertain than in Marion County. Indian troubles 
dominated the county's early history, but the military origins of Pike's citizens 
gave them the means to establish peace and security. In 1830, the county's 
citizens banded together in an unofficial militia to drive out fifty or sixty Sac 
and Fox Indians who were squatting on the land and raiding local farmers' 
livestock. Two years later a company was raised in Atlas �ownship to fight 
the Blackhawk War, a short distance to the north. Prospective volunteers 
were summoned to a ·grand meeting and were encouraged by martial music 
and buckets of whiskey to take the fateful step fonvard. By the time the buckets 
. 6 
had passed round three times, a hundred men had enlisted. 
The county's contribution to the Civil War was much more significant; 
over half the electorate enlisted in the Union c ause. Not only did residents 
of the county supply companies to various Union regiments, but i n  1862 nine 
hundred Pike County men formed their own regiment, the 99th Infantry. This 
unit saw sixty-two days of action between 1863 and 1865; its most important 
5 .  History of Pike County, pp. 196, 246,  and Past and Present of Pike 
County, PP.· 34, 44, 45, 5�, . 79, 80. 
6.  Past and Present of Pike County, pp. 34, 52-54. 
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engagement came at Vicksburg. In addition, the Henderson Home Guard, 
130 strong, was formed in 1861. probably as a defense against any proslavery 
7 
activity from across the river iu Missouri. 
After the war citizens of Pike County returned to farming and to the 
status quo. Ideas for change promoted by the war were resisted by the 
county during the post-war era. Plans for bringing the railroad to Pike County, 
begun in 1863, suffered a setback in l867 when the voters narrowly defeated 
a borid issue to finance construction. It started again in 1869 when a group 
of citizens raised $32, 000 and several townships assessed themselves $150, 000 
to provide the necessary fnnds. But not until 1872 did county officials finally 
get approval from the voters to issue railroad bonds, thereby guaranteeing 
Pike County an alternative to river transportation--the Wabash, St. Louis 
8 
and Pacific Railway Company , Incorporated. 
The direction of Pike County politics might have been predicted by the 
conditions of agriculture in the county. In general, farming in the county 
was good. As in Marion County, corn was the major crop. But unlike her 
sister county, Pike had 72 percent more land in corn production, and the 
yield was less than a half bushel below the state average of 38. 1 bushels per 
acre. While oats were Marion's secondary crop, in Pike County that position 
was accorded wheat. Here also the county's production average of 15.  8 
bushels per acre approximated the state average of 16. 3 bushe�s. Even in oat 
prqduction Pike bested Marion County. Although only a tertiary crop in Pike 
7 .  Past and Present of Pike County, pp. 70-72, and Hisbry of Pike 
County, pp. 373-82. 
8.  Past and Present of Pike County, pp. 107-09. 
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County, oat yields averaged 28. 3 bushels per acre compared to 24. 8 bushels 
in Marion. Overall, although Pike County was only 31 percent larger than 
Marion County, Pike farmers had over twice as much land in cereal production. 
In terms of total improved acreage, the discrepency was n:ot as great; Pike 
Count�; contained only 67. 5 percent more improved acreage. Thus, agriculture 
was considerably more advanced in Pike County than in Marion, their size 
9 
differences notwithstanding. 
However, it is very likely not all shared in the agricultural wealth of 
the Pike County. The county's eastern townships were reported to consist 
of mostly broken land--very rough, and suitable only for livestock production--
not the fertile, well-watered, well-cultivated prairie and bottom land described 
in the central and western townships. lO The relationship between political 
discontent and the topography of the seven townships selected for study is shown 
by Table 11. It is worth noting that all the politicnlly dissident townships, where 
the Populists out-polled one or both major parties, are located together in the 
11 
southern quarter of the county. Figure 3 illustrates this grouping. 
Yet the relative success of the People's Party in Pike County is surprising 
i n  two respects. First, the attitude of the local press showed a general lack of 
concern about the third party movement. Evon the few editorial attacks launched 
against the Populists conveyed supreme confidence. Commenting on the physical 
9. Statist.ics of Agriculture: 1 890, pp. 205, 363. 
10. History of Pike County, pp. 404-868, passim 
11. The single exception was Ross Township in the extreme southwest 
of the county. Tax records were unavailable for this township, so it could 
not be included in the study. 
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qualities of a Populist publication he h:ad received, a contributor in the. county's 
major paper noted that "its faded appearance represented its party, which seems 
to be fading away . . . .  Poor little thing. If thou art so easily done for, why was 
12 . . . 
you ever begun for. " But more often the Populists merely were ignored and 
were given little coverage of any kind. Even the president of the local Farmers' 
Alliance was not a third party man. 13 
However, the newspapers ' neglect of the People's Party may have been a 
purposeful attempt to help maintain the social and political status quo, a course 
of action which may distort the third p::irty's actual place in the history of Pike 
County. In any case, the radicals seem to have achieved a level of disorganization 
matching Populist efforts in Marion County. Pike County P?pulists apparently 
12. Pike County Democrat, January 12, 1892. 
13. Ibid. 
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had no central committee or county organization. The local press did cover 
the organizational meeting of the People 's Party in St. Louis in February 
14 
1892, and at least two area men attended it. But if  the county's radicals 
organized the March 26 tovmship meetings and held the April 16 county 
convention mandated by the St. Loui.s .meeting, �ike County's two newspapers 
never reported it. In April's township elections the Populists fielded slates 
in only three of the county's 24 townships. All third party candidates were 
soundly beaten--in Flint Township by a three to two margin, and in Perry and 
15 
Griggsville townships by nearly ten to one. That disaster, plus two rallies 
in the autumn of 1892 mark the extent of the Populist's political activity in 
16 
Pike County--at least as reported by the press. On the other hand, both 
papers reported indiscriminately the numerous activities of each major party 
and seemed neutral in the election, especially when compared to the highly 
vocal political organs in Marion County. 
Compared to other areas of Illinois, the People's Party was successful 
in Pike County despite its lack of organization and activity. The Populists 
captured Hardin, Montezuma, and Pearl townships outright; in Pearl the 
third party received more votes than the Republicans and Dem9crats, combined. 
In Newburg and Spring Creek townships the Populists ran second to the 
Republicans and to the Democrats, respectively. Yet, adjacent to this block 
14.  Independent Press, February 24 and March 2 ,  1892. 
15. Tuid. , April 6, 1892. 
16.  Ibid. , September 14 and October 5, 1892. 
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of radical support, the two major parties carried Detroit and Martinsburg 
townships by the largest nrnrgins in Pike County. After examining data 
concerning the condition of agriculture in all seven of these to\vnships, o n e  
i s  hard-pressed to explain the e}q1lain the existance of Populist strength i n  
some locales but not.in others. However, some relationship� do exist 
between townships characteristics and third party strength in Pike County. 
The fact that those associations are more hidden and subtle than in Marion 
County underscores the greater complexity of political behavior in Pike. 
Although in Marion County a generally positive relationship existed 
1 7  
between landowning and Populism, in Pike County it  did not. Not only 
were all seven Pike County townships filled with tenants, but as Table 12 
details, the Populist townships had the highest and the lowest incidence of 
resident landowners . . Interspersed among the Populist areas in the table 
are Martinsburg, with second highest percentage of resident ln.ndholders, 
and Detroit, which falls exactly in the middle, with two radical townships 
showing a greater proportion of landowning farmers , and three Populist ones 
having less. Neither Martinsburg nor Detroit gave any significant support 
to the third party in 1892. 
While fewer residents of Pike County townships actually owned the 
land they farmed, those who did own it controlled at least as much of their 
township' s  resources as Marion landowners did. Carrigan Township, with 
1 7 .  Chapter 5, pp. 66-68. 
Township 
Detroit 
Hardin 
TABLE 12 
PERCENT AGE OF RESIDENTS 0Wl\1ING LAND AND 
PERCENT AGE OF TOWNSHIP LAND THEY OWNED 
IN PIKE COUNTY, ILLINOIS IN 18.92. 
Res idents Land owned 
owning land by Residents 
26. 1 53. 3 
19. 6 51. 7 
Martinsburg 31.  8 57 . 3  
Montezuma 28. 7 59. 3 
Newburg 38. 2 53. 8  
Pearl 22. 3 50 . 1  
Spring Creek 22. 6 51.  g 
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Index of 
Inequality 
26. 2 
32. 1 
25. 5 
30. 6  
2 5 . 6 
27. 8 
29. 3 
Source: Assessor 's Books for Detroit, Hardin, Martinsburg, Newburg·, 
Pearl, and Spring Creek townships for 1892, and for Montezuma 
TO\vnship for 1891; and "Aggregate Popt1lation By Minor Civil 
DiYisions, '1 Compendium of the Eleventh. Census : 1890, Part I-­
Population , pp. 123-124. 
the highest tenancy rate in Marion County, shows about the same percent of · 
resident landowners as does Newburg Township, the Pike County Township· 
with the lowest tenancy rate. But the 38. 2 percent of Newburg's residents 
who owned land, possessed 53. 8 percent of the township's real estate. In  
. 18 Carrigan 34. 1 percent of the people owned only 40. 2 percent of the land. 
The difference between the percent of residents owning property and the 
percentage of the property they own is an important one. 19 It provides some 
idea about the comparative degree of equality, or inequality, in the distribution 
18. See Table 4, p. 68. 
19. See pp. 69, 70. 
of property in the various townships. Theoretically, if resources are 
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divided equally, thirty percent of the people occupy thirty percent of the land, 
seventy percent of the people seventy percent of the land, and so on. Land 
distribution in Marion County was rel atively equal in all five townships, and it 
does not seem a factor explaining radical political behavior there. However in 
.Pike County, not only was property distribution greatly unequal in all seven 
townships, bnt the degree of inequality varied among them in such a way that 
it creates a strong though not perfect relationship with Populist strength. 
As Table 12 shows, not only was the incidence of landownership much 
lower in Pike townships than in Marion, but in Pike it also fluctuated much more 
from township to township--ranging from 19. 6 percent of the people in Hardin 
controlling 51. 7 percent of the land, to 28.  7 percent in Montezuma controlling 
59. 3 percent of the land, to 31. 8 percent in Martinsburg controlling 57. 3 
percent of the land. Subtracting the percent of "residents owning land" from 
. the percent of "land owned by residents" provides an index of !'inequality .' 1 1 By 
itself this figure has no real meaning, but compared to the index of inequality 
for other townships it provides a measurement of relative inequality fn land 
distribution among each township's residents. The larger the index figure the 
greater the inequality of distribution. For example, in Hardin, which has an 
index figure of 32 . 1, land was less equally distributed among the residents 
than in Martinsburg Township, which had an index figure of 25. 5. Table 12 
shows the four townships where inequality in distribution of resources was 
greatest were strong Populist areas i n  1892. Of the three townships where the 
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i nequality was least, two--Martinshurg and Detroit--gave almost no support 
to the third party in the election. Furthermore, in Hardin and Montezuma 
townships, where the inequality was most acute, the Populists won an absolute 
majority of the vote s. 
Unfortunately, no such strong relationship exists when comparing radical 
politics to farm size, farm value, and degree of improvement, as i llustrated 
20 by Table 1 3 .  Populist townships in Pike County contained both the largest 
r·· 
. T .:\TIL"S 13 
J\\T 8111\GE SIZI:, .c\CTU:S IN PHODUCTIO:-f, 1\ND VALUE OF 
F 1\HMS OWNED HY :nESIDENTS OF s�;:LECTED TOWNS.HIPS 
IN PIKE COUNTY, I LLn .. ;orn, I N  1 892 -
j . 
Intprovecl Percent 
• • 
i . Township Farm Size Acres Improved I Voluc 
L. 
I 
-, 
Farm V�lue J Per' 1\cro --
I 
I 
; 
l J 
L 
1�13. OAcrcH 90. 6 · 63 . 3  $11�3 "' 7. 92 Detroit •y 
Hal'clin 1 213. 0 1 150. 5 70 . 7  1366 6. t12 I lVI �1rti nsburg 135. 7 1 0'!. 9 7 7 . 5 12;30 6 . 62 
1'1Iontezum3 116. 9 
I 
77. 3 66. 3 1015 8. ()!) 
Newburg 115 . 2 90. 5 '18 .  3 1310 11 .  1t3 
Penrl 98. 8 38. 9 39. 4 410 4 . 17 
I 
Spring Creek 110. 6 59. G I 53 . 9  451 4 . 07 
Source: Assessor's Books Io-r Detroit, Hardin, 11.:Ir.rtinshurg, Newburg, 
Pearl, and Spring Creek townships for 1892, and l\Tontezu�nn 
Tmn;.ship fm.· 1891. 
and the smallest farms, as in Hardin and Pearl, and the largest and smallest 
nwnber .of improved acres on them. Furthermore, with the exception of Pearl 
l 
I 
20 .  The data in this table must be interpreted with the same methodological . 
qualifications as used for Table 5 for Marion County in Chapter 5. These 
qualifications are outlined in Chapter 5 on pp. 68, 69. 
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and Spring Creek townships, no consistantly significant differences in degree 
of improvement exists between farms in the politically radical areas and farms 
in the more moderate ones. The same lack of association is also shown by . 
considering average farm values in the various townships. In this case, farms 
i n  two of the Populist townships ware worth the least and second least; but in 
two other Populist townships they had the highest and second highest values of 
the areas studied. Centrally located in the measurement of farm values were 
two non-Populist and one Populist tO\�nship--petroit, Martinsburg, and 
Montezuma, respectively. 
Average land values further reflect the lack of any relationship between 
the agricultural conditions shown in Table 13 and radical voting behavior. 
Real property in some Populist townships, like Newburg and Montezuma, 
was of high value per acre. In other radical areas, such as Pearl and Spring 
Creek, the land was poor--probably in both value and ·quality--and land in 
Hardin, the remaining Populist township, differed little in value from 
Martinsburg, where the third party found no significant support i n  1892. 
Table 14 specifies this lack of relationship by showing values by land classi­
fication, thus remo}'ing the differences in degree of improvement as a factor 
affecting the values in Table 13. It  also considers all land in the various 
townships, and therefore it is a more comprehensive measurement than Table 
13, which only deals with land owned by the townships '  residents. 
Note that once the differences in degree of improvement are removed, 
the lack of relationship between land values and Populism becomes even more 
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CO!vIPJ\Hi\TIVE Lf\l\1J VJ\ J.,UES IN SELCCTED TOWNSHIPS 
OF PIKE COUNTY, ILLINOIS, IN 1892 
[;,�wnship 
Lnncl l lmprovcd Land Value Per Ae;rc Improve_d Unimprvvccl L�nd All L�rnd 
- ----·-
Detroit Gl. G% $12. 63 $3 . 41 s �}. 08 
Hnrclin 68. 5 8. 12 2. 97 6. 3 7  
Martinsburg 73. 5 8. 52 2. 77 7 . 0 0  
Montezuma G0. 2  1 2 .  t!4 1. 90 8. 2G 
Newburg 7 8 . 6 12. 38 3. 71 1 0 . 0 1  
Pearl 36. 5 7. 87 2 . 32 4. :rn 
Spring Creek 49. 4 6 . 15 1. 41 3. 75 
I 
Source: Assessors' Books for Detroit, Hardin, M8 rtinsburg, Newburg, 
Pearl, and Spring Creek tmvnships in 1892, and Montezum� 
Township for 1891.  
apparent. Since it has already been suggested the value of improved acreage 
21 
is a function of land quality, fertility, and productivity, one can say that 
while the working acreage in some Populist townships was poor, it was no 
worse than farm in some non-Populist areas. Furthermore, the same kind of 
statement also is true for Pike County's good land. The most valuable acreage 
in the townships studied was found in two Populist and one non-Populist areas--
Montezuma, Newburg, and Detroit townships, respectively. Thus, unlike in 
Marion County, no relationship between radical politics and land values, quality, 
or productivity existed in Pike. 
The only possible correlation between farm characteristics and Populist 
e,l<;3ctor,nl. strength in J?ike County is found by employi�g a rather indirect and 
2L See Chapter 5, p. 73. 
sophisticated statistical measurement method. Farms in Pike County averaged 
135.  0 acres in 1892; of that amount 103. 0 acres was improved land. Although, 
as Table 13 already has established, no relationship exists between Populism 
and farm size or number of acres producing crops, comparing each township's 
deviation from the county norm uncovers the fact that Populist townships were 
farther from the county average than were non-Populist ones. Farms i·n 
conservative political areas were close to the county norms for size and for 
number of improved acres. Farms in Populist townships were more distant 
from county averages in these two measurements; they either were much larger 
or much smaller than the arithmetic mean for Pike County farms. This 
discovery produces strong Spearman Coefficient of Correlation values of O. 789 
and 0. 859 when comparing the amount of Populism in each township to its 
variation with mean farm size and number of improved acres on Pike County 
22 
farms; but the result is only a statistical curiosity. The Spearman value 
statistically "proves" the bigger or the smaller a radical township farm· was--
or the greater or lesser amount of improved acres the farmer was working--
the stronger Populist sentiment was i n  that locale. An explanation may be found 
to account for the lack of radical political behavior in the non-Populist townships; 
conditions there were average for Pike County, and the residents therefore had 
no reason to exhibit a high degree of discontent. But what factors do townships 
with farms much larger than average have in common with areas.where farms 
are much smaller than normal, which would explain their tendency to support 
22. See the Appendix for an explanation of the Spearman Coefficient of 
Correlation as a statistical tool. 
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a third party ticket in 1892 ? No reasonable interpretive judgement can be 
attached to this relationship. 
However, as in Marion County, Populism i n  Pike was closely associated 
with the degree to which local agriculture had been mechanized. Table 15 shows 
DEGREE OF 1\GIUCULTUU i\T, J.:-,JECHA�,;; z x rroN A!:.-TO i'i"G 
Ll.NDOW0T.T.NG 1;'1\Hl\Tl'.: ! �S Pi S.t�LECTED }'OWNSifLf>S OF 
PIKE COUNTY, ( LOLINDIS, H:�D2 
Towm.>hip 
• 
Detroit 58 $ 381 27 
Ifardin fj 5  358 1 5  
Martinsburg 101 488 39 
Montc::r,uma 104 7-10 '12 
$ G . 5 1  
6. 50 
4. 84 
7. 12 
Newburg 108 1135 35 1 0 . 50 
Pearl 75 38!! 2 8  
Spring Creek 99 701 25 
Source: Assessors' Books for Detroit, H:irdin, Martinshurg, Newburg, 
Spring C reek and Pc: n·l townships for 1892, 01:d Montczumn 
Township for 1891. 
this relationship. The average value of implements on each farm is obviously 
not associated with radical politics since the townships with the highest· and 
lowest average values both were Populist areas. But, this measurement is 
affected by the number of farmers working landholdings using only rudimentary 
farming techniques and by the great variation in degree. of land improvement 
among the seven townships, illustrated by Table 13. Nevertheless,. it is worth 
noting that a generally higher percentage of farmers in non-Populist townships 
5. 12 
7. 08 
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reported no farm machinery than did i n  areas where the third party was 
strong. Table 1 6  takes into account this factor and also the variance in 
percentage of improved acreage on farms in the townships studied. It 
standardizes the difference in degree of improvement by providing not an 
absolute value for agricultural mechanization but instead a value per improved 
acre. 
..... ... _ 
TABLE lG 
V 1\LUE OF AGRICULTURAL MACHINERY A:N'D IMPLEMENTS 
PER IMPROVED ACRE OF LAl\'D IN SELECTED TOWNSHIPS 
OF PIKE COUNTY, ILLINOIS, IN 1892 
Township 
Detroit 
Hardin 
Martinsburg 
Montezuma 
Newburg 
Pearl 
Spring Creek 
Source: 
Value Per Improved Acre 
Owned by Residents All Improved L<lnd 
$0 . 072 $0. 079 
. 043 . 042 
. 046 · .  043 
. 092 . 1 09 
. 11 6  . 100 
. 132 . 139 
. 1 19 . 112 
Assessors' Books for Detroit, Hardin, Martinsburg, 
NewbLirg, Pearl, and Spring Creek townships for 
1892,  and Montezuma Township for 1891. 
A quick look at this table shows the average improved acre in the Populist 
townships had more machinery available to work on i t  than in the non-Populist 
townships. The only exception to this relationship was Hardin Township� which 
the People's Party carried. But e�erywhere else it is apparent the Populist 
townships were much more highly mechanized. Although this characteristic 
' 
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cannot be also tied to land values, as it could in Marion County, Pike 
Populists must have bem frustrated too, because their investment i n  farm 
machinery had not paid off in more productivity than their unmechanized 
neighbors enjoyed. 
Table 17 established that, as in Marion County, no correlation existed 
between personal property values and radical voting behavior. Although the 
J)1';1�SO.L'! :\I. J>�:OPEHTY Ji:J r_;DI.NGS .l"N s::.;: LJ;;(:T1�0 �l.'O\(l.M3I-1IPS 
(.)}' :nKE C0Uf1'l'Y :!:'CH .lS9'.� 
144 
1 9-i 8?. l 
G.2 !>7 
l �7 f l l G  �--�--� ---�---L__---�·--��---_.,.. 
� Source: .Asse.:>sors' Books fo1· Detroit, H;•rd in, l\f;.n-ttnsburg: 1-!'eY.rburg, T'0:::1·l, 
anc.'1. Spi:ing Crzi:::k to\·rns!1ips for 1892, <rnd j\[ontezmna for 1892; und 
"Aggregate PopulnUon by Minor Civil Divisions, 1 1 Compendium of ...... � .. , 
the E1eyenth Censu:3 , 1 8 !3 0 ,  Pnrt I--Populnti.':'n, pp. 12;1-124. · 
amount of personal property--including livestock, farm implements, stocks and 
bonds, and furniture--varied more among the townships of Pike than it did in 
Marion, no definite pattern proves residents of Populist areas were consistantly 
richer or· poorer than their non-Populist neighbors. Nor was the incidence of 
propertyless residents any greater or less in the Populist townships. 
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Comparing the data in Table 13 with the information provided by Table 16 
gives a good picture of the conditions in Pike County prompting support of a 
radical third party in 1892. Close examination of both tables reveals a 
significant point; the townships where farms had the fewest number of acres in 
production were lhe most highly mechanized. Those with the largest number of 
improved acres were the least mechanized. If all the townships are ranked in 
order according to the increasing number of improved acres on their farms and 
also by the decreasing value of their machinery, the results are identical. 
Since its farms were the most highly mechanized and had the smallest amount 
of improved land, Pearl Township ranks number one in both catagories, followed 
in  order by Spring Creek, Montezuma ,  and Newburg--all Populist townships in 
1892. The politically moderate townships, Detroit and Martinsburg, rank fifth 
and sixth on both the farm size and mechanization lists. Only the third party 
stronghold of Hardin, which was least mechanized and had the largest number of 
improved acres per farm, broke the pattern by ranking last. But with the exception 
of Hardin Township, there exists a strong and explainable relationship between 
Populism, land in production, and mechanization of agriculture. 
As in Marion County, farmers i n  the Populist townships· of P�ke were 
making an effort to improve their agricultural situation by using machinery. · 
In  this way they attempted to compensate for the small size of their farms by 
increasing their efficiency and, hopefully, their incomes. Though their land 
was no poorer or less productive than their politically moderate neighbors, the 
Populist farmers of Pike's rugged eastern townships had less of it. Furthermore, 
�I 
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their small amount of productive acreage largely was owned by the people who 
farmed it. With money tied up in the hind .and also in machinery to work it, 
residents of the Populist townships had a double incentive to stay on and fight 
to improve their situation. But the continued decline in agriculture, despite a 
heavy financial investment in land and machinery, ultimately had the same effect 
in Pike County township as it did in Marion County in 1892; it brought out the 
intensely frustrated farmers to vote for the People's Party. 
CHAPTER VII 
Demographic Trends in Marion and Pike Counties 
Any attempt. to study political behavior ultimately must deal with 
people--not necessarily as individuals, but people as the masses. More 
specifically, population trends sometimes help assess the general economic 
condition of an area. The degree of movement in or out of an area, like 
a city or township, or even a state, provides some hints about the oppor-
tunities there, at least from the residents' point of view. The most notable 
manifestation of this phenomenon is the almost complete depopulation of 
areas in Kansas and Nabraska after the collapse of agriculture in the mid­
Eighties. 
1 The tremendous flood of immigrants to the United States starting 
in the 1840's provides an example of people drawn to an area because they 
perceived it offered great opportunity. 
But any l arge� rapid movement of people to or from a place is both 
socially and economically unsettling to its residents. The social aspect of 
rapid population change might include such manifestations as weakened 
institutions--churches, fraternal and occupational associations, and local political 
groups--due to constant fluctuations of membership caused by people entering 
or leaving the area. Friendship patterns and social structure would be disrupted . 
. The economic consequences would be reflected most in property values and in 
1.  Farmer,. "Economic Background of Frontier Populism , "  pp. 420-22, and 
Shannon, Farmers' Last Frontier, pp. 307, 308. 
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the labor market. 'I'he Latter consequence would not be especially pronounced 
in family farming areas like Marion and Pike counties, but large numbers 
of persons moving in or out of these counties, or o·f particular townships, 
certainly would affect the real estate· market for farmland; to a great extent, 
the law of supply and demand would determine the price per acr_e asked, and 
the price realized. Also, rapid population movements put a strain on public 
institutions, due to overcrowding on the one hand or to loss of tax support on 
the other. Examples might be schools, township or county roads, and public 
charity for paupers--both Marion and Pike counties had poor farms for 
indigent persons, and each township had a poor fund for outdoor relief. 
It is not unlikely that such social and economic upheavals would have political 
manifestations on election day. 
Thus a population study can be of value to an analysis of voting behavior, 
if only to prove the null hypothesis--that no relationship exists between the 
demographic characteristics of a political unit and its voting patterns. Such 
seems to be the case in both Marion and Pike counties. No significant asso­
ciations between population trends or characteristics and political behavior 
can be established. At first glance, a signific·ant difference in popu�ation trends 
seems to exist in the two counties, as shown in Table 18. While the population 
of Marion County showed an overall growth rate of 28. 3 percent between 1870 
and 1890, the population of Pike County remained fairly constant. However, 
some conceptual dangers are hidden in these general figures. The increase 
in Marion County was neither steady nor widespread. In fact, ·the greatest 
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TABLE 1 8  
POPULATION GROWTH OF SELECTED TOWNSHIPS IN 
MARION COUNTY AND PIKE COUNTY, ILUNOIS, 
1870-1900 
Civil Unit 1870 1880 1890 
Marion County 20, 622 23, 686 24, 341 
Carrigan Township x 875 774 
Haines Township x 1 , 129 1 , 003 
Meacham Township 835 927 790 
Raccoon Township 1 , 139 1 , 181 1 , 137 
Tonti Township x 900 954 
Pike County 30, 768 33, 751 31, 000 
-
Detroit Township 1 , 056 1 , 008 833 
Hardin Township 1 ,  468 1 , 410 1, ()51 
Martinsburg Township 1 , 466 1 , 353 1 , 186 
Montezuma Township 1 , 498 1 , 478 1,  360 
Newburg Township 1 , 540 1 , 243 1, 060 
Pearl Township 628 845 1 , 256 
Spring Creek Township 1 , 009 1 , 365 1 , 590 
Source: "�opulation of Civil Divisions Less than Counties , "  
Ninth Census, Vol. 1 ,  The Statistics of Population 
of the United States, pp. 116,  118 and " Aggregate 
Population by Minor Civil Division, " Compendium 
of the Eleventh Census, 1890 Part I - - Population, 
pp. 122, 124, 125; "Population of States and 
Territories by Minor Civil Divisions: 1890 and 
1900 , "  Census Reports, Vol. 1 ,  Twelfth Census of 
the United States, Taken in the Ye�r 1900, Part !-­
Population, pp. 126, 128. 
1900 
30, 446 
891 
1 , 427 
1 , 073 
1 , 215 
918 
3 1 , 595 
847 
896 
1 , 157 
1 , 420 
1 , 127 
1 , 518 
1 , 557 
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surge in the county's growth came in the years after the election of 1892; 
before 1890, the growth of . Marion County was only slightly more rapid 
than the population increase in Pike . Furthermore, the very small rise 
in Pike County population in general conceals great variation and fluctuation 
at the township level. 
In both Marion and Pike counties, most of the to\U1Ships studied suffered 
some population loss during the 1880' s. Exceptions to this trend were Tonti 
Township in Marion County, and Spring Creek · and Pearl townships in Pike 
County, all of which showed varying degrees of growth during the decade. 
Two of the Marion townships experiencing marked population losses, Haines 
and Meacham, exhibited strong Populist undercurrents in 1892. However, 
Carrigan Township also suffered a large loss but gave almost no support to 
the Populist ticket; and Raccoon Township, the only one of the People's Party 
carried in the election experienced the smallest loss of all. In Pike County 
comparisons of voting trends to demographic trends are equally inconclusive. 
Populist townships in Pike showed the only gains and the biggest loss in 
population. But other Populist townships had gains or losses not significantly 
different from townships where the radical party had no strength at all. Table 19 
specifies these relationships by outlining j population trends in the several 
townships in Marion and Pike counties during the two decades prior to the 
election of 1892. 
The reason for this mass exodus during the Eighties is a matter for 
some speculation, and is of more than a little concern to this study of agrarian 
t.� .... 
Ti\BLE 1 �> 
POPUL/\TION CHANGE I N  SELECTED TOWNSHIPS IN 
PlKE COUNTY Al'\1) MARION COUNTY, 1870-1900 
1 870- 80 F 1870·-90 
� Marion County +15% + 3% 
Cnrrig�n x -12 x 
Hnines x -11 x 
Meacham +11 -17 - 5 
R accoon + 4 - 4 0 
Tonti x + 6 x 
-.· -
Pike County +10% - 8% + 1 % 
Detroit - 5 - 17 -2 6 
Hardin - 4 -25 -28 
Martinsburg - 8 -12 -19 
Montezuma - 1 - 8 - 9 
Newburg -19 -1 5  . -31 
Pearl +35 +49 +100 
Spring Creek +35 +17 + 58 · 
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J,,.'"':. 
, 
• 
Source: "Population of Civil Divisions Less than Counties, " 
Nint4 Census, Vol. 1 ,  The Statistics of Pooulation 
of the United States, pp. llG, 118 and "Aggregate 
Population by Minor Civil Division, 11 Compendium 
of the Eleventh Census, 1890 Part I - - Population , 
pp. 122, 124, 125.  
conditions and radical politics. · While no good way exists .to ascertain whether ., ... .. 
outmigrants merely moved from one township to another, or whether they left 
the county, or even the state of Illinois, i t  is not unrealistic to claim that such 
drastic population movements indicate to some degree the discontent within the 
effected townships. Happy, contented, and prosperous people obviously are 
less likely to pull up stakes and leave than are persons who face economic 
h_ardships. Yet from the data available, the movement of large numbers of 
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people in and out of the several townships between 1870 and 1890 cannot be 
validly and directly associated with expression of political discontent i n  the 
election of 1892. N<;>r can it directly be related to economic conditions in 
those townships. 
As Table 19 shows, not all townships undergoing extreme population 
changes between 1870 and 1890 showed Populist strength in 1892. In Marion 
County, as already mentioned, Carrigan, a non-Populist township showed a 
greater population loss in the Eighties than did the Populist enclaves of Haines 
and Raccoon, but less than the third Populist township of Meacham. Similarly, 
in Pike County, the non-Populist townships of Detroit and Martinsburg suffered 
greater losses in population from 1870 to 1890 than did the Populist Montezuma 
Township--but less than Hardin and Newburg townships, which were both areas 
. . 
of third party strength. The two Populist townships of Pearl and Spring Creek 
reversed the traditional pattern and experienced tremendous growth during that 
same period. The lack of any relationship between population trends and voting 
behavior can be statistically shown by Yule's Q, an easily figured, easily 
interpreted measurement of association between two factors. 2 The value of 
Yule's Q varies between +l. 000, for a perfect positive correlation between 
the two variables, to a -1. 000 for a perfect negative or reverse relationship. 
A value near or at zero shows no associ ation between the two variables; in 
the case where the two variables are population growth or loss, and radical 
2. For an explanation of Yule's Q as a statistical measure, see the 
Appendix. 
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or traditional politics, Yule's Q is zero, statistic ally verifying the lack of 
correlation between the two factors. Table 20 shows the calculations; the 
townships are catagorized according to the last ta,ble.  
TABLE 20 
CORRELATION BETWEEN POPULA110N CHAN9E AND 
VOTING BEHAVIOR I N  SELECTED TOWNSHIPS OF 
MARION Al\TD PIKE COUNTIES, ILI.JNOIS IN 1892 
Population 
Gain 
Population 
Loss 
Pop-u ist . on- opu is l N P r t 
2 1 
township township 
6 3 
.township township 
Q=(ad-bc)(ad + be) 
Q=(2�3-G�1)(2J..3 + 61tl} 
Q=(6-6)(6 +6) 
Q=O . 
But other methodological problems also are inherent in relating voting 
behavior to the p,opulation data shown above in Table 19.  The percentages 
shown in that table represent not chainges only. The actual movement of 
people through the townships of the two counties could be much higher i n  many 
or all cases. For example, although census figures for Montezuma Township 
in  Pike County show only a nine percent population loss between 1870 and 1890, 
very likely substantially more than nine percent of the township's population 
actually moved during these twenty years. The .figure in Table 1 9  does not 
�! 
, 
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necessarily mean the same people lived there throughout the period. Such 
could be the case, but if the number of people leaving a township during a 
decade was equalled by the number of people moving in, the net change in 
population would be zero, and the township would seem demographically 
static. The nine percent figure for Montezuma shows only that nine percent 
more people left the township than entered it between 1870 and 1890. Theor-
etically, it is possible that no person living in Raccoon Township in Marion 
County in 1870 was still there by 1890, and that they all had been replaced by 
new people. Under such circumstances, Raccoon would be the least stable 
township in Marion County, not the most stable, as Table 19 shows. All 
reason and evidence point to an actual gross population change much greater 
than the net figures used in the table. In fact, a planned chapter on political 
leaders in the townships of Marion County had to be abandoned when only 
18 of 55 men so identified could be found in the manuscript census schedules 
for 1880. This unforfonate development further illustrated the high population 
mobility in all townships studied, and probably in those not studied too. Doubt:-
lessly, the actual movement of people in and out of Marion County townships 
was much higher than the net figures in the table indicate. 
Any relationship between population trends and voting patterns is equally 
elusive when the economic factor of agricultural growth is also considered. 
Table 21 specifies the relationship, or more accurately the lack of relationship, 
between population and voting when an economic variable is introduced. The 
table below considers population growth in the light of agricultural expansion; 
TABLE 21 
CHANGE IN PEH CAPITA LAND BAS.8 FOH SELECTED 
TO\VNSH1PS IN' PIKE COUNTY, lLlJNOIS, 1870 TO 1890, 
A�"D IN J:II,'\RION COUNTY, I LLINOIS, 1880 TO 1890 
Per Capita Acres Per C::ipita Acres 
1880 1890 Net Change 
l\lurio11 County 9. G 9. 1 -0. 5 Acres 
Carrignn 1 6 . 3 20. 8 +4. 5 
Haines 1 0 . 5 14. 7 +4. 2  . 
Mcach::m.1 15. 7 20. 8 +5. 1 
Haccoon 10. 5 12. 9 +2. 9  
Tonti 1.5. 1 14. G -0. 5 
' •  1870 : 1890 Net Clumge 
, \ ·  · .. .. 
Pike Couf!.ty . 10. G 10 .. 4 -0. 2 Acres 
Detroit 3. 2 11 . 4 .  +8. 2  
Hard(n 9. 1 14. 7 +5. 6 
Martinsburg 9 . 4  13. 9 +4. 5  
Montezuma 8. 8 8. 8 0 
Newb!.lrg 9. 9 18. �- +8 . 4  
Pearl -- 4 . 3 --
Spring C reek 6. 7 6. S +0. 2 
Source: Assessors' Books for Carrigan, Meacham, and Tonti 
townships for 1879 and 1892, for Haines Township for 
1878 and 1892, and for R accoon Township for 1879 and 
1891; Assessors' Books for Hardin, Newburg, and Spring 
Creek tmvnships for 1873 and 1892; for Detroit and · 
l\'Iartinsburg townships for 1874 and 1892, for l\Iontezuma 
Township for 1874 and 1 8 9 1 ,  l:lnd for Pearl Township for 
1891; "Farm Areas and Farm Values, "  Comnendium on the 
Tenth Census (June 1 ,  1880).  Part I ,  pp. 697-698; " Number, 
Acreage. and Valuation of F2rms and Products, with Cost 
of Fertilizers, by Counties: Census of 1890, " Statistics of 
.:b.griculture, ·1890. 
1 1 0  
1 1 1  
it  tests the hypothesis that the effect of population ch�mges in the various 
townships was mitigated, or else made more severe, by developmental 
trends in local agriculture. Dividing the figures for each township's improved 
acreage by its population, the table provides a per capita acreage value which, 
when comparisons are made over time, weighs economic development by the 
population factor. In other words, it standardizes all townships by population 
and thus removes that factor as a variable to be considered in explaining 
the growth or decline of agriculture in the townships being studied. However, 
once again, the only hypothesis proved by this examination is the null hypothesis. 
Population trends and the conditions which they might have caused apparently 
were not instrumental' in shaping political attitudes. 
In effect, Table 21 shows changes in the economic circumstances of 
the townships being studied. Since they were predominatly agricultural, their 
improved land and its products provided most of the support for each township's 
population. By m.easuring the per capita improved acres in each township, 
comparative economic levels and changes in them over time can be determined. 
For example, every man, woman, and child in Carrigan Township, Marion 
County, theoretically was supported economically by 1 6 .  3 acres of improved 
land in 1880·. Ten years later, although the township's population had declined 
12 percent, the per capita economic land base had risen by 27. 6 percent, or 
by 4. 5 acres. 'I\velve percent of this increase was due to the fewer people, and 
the other 1 5 .  6 percent to the fact that more land was in production. In Pike 
County's Spring Creek Township, the· expansion of farming kept pace with the 
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township's 58 percent population growth between 1870 and 1890, and the 
per capita land base remained almost unchanged. The outcome was the same 
in Montezuma Township, also in Pike. county, although the population dropped 
slightly over the twenty year period, because an equal percentage of land went 
out of production. 
Actually, a person who depended on the same or only a slightly larger 
amount of producing land to support him in 1890 than he had in 1870 and 1880 
probably was in worse shape finanCially in the Ninties than in the Eighties. 
The drop in crop prices during the 1880's meant that produce from the same 
amount of land provided an individual with less money to support himself. How 
much less cannot be measured here, for that depended on what crop his land 
was producing and what the local m_arket prices actually were. Besides, Table 
21 only establishes each person's theoretical arithmetic share of the working 
acreage in his township, without regard to whether in reality it was wheat 
land, or in oats or corn, or whatever. 
The important information provided by the table is the comparison it 
makes between townships in the same county at the same time. The man, 
woman, or child who was supported by 20. 8 acres of cropland was better off 
than the individual in another township during the same year who only had a 
12. 9 acre mathematical share of the fand for his financial support. Unfortun­
ately for this study, which is searching for a universal element to explain the 
strength of the People ' s  Party, the Populist townships in both counties we're 
among the highest and also among the lowest in the number of acres mathematically 
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supporting each member of the township's population. Nor does the amount 
or direction of change in that support base consistantly explain the incidence 
of Populism in the townships of Marion and Pike counties. The null hypothesis 
again applies. 
No figures exist to show adult male population at the township level. 
However, enough other demographic information is extant to allow reasonably 
accurate estimation of the adult male population for each of the townships being 
studied, and once done, to permit comparison of their levels of political activity. 
The census tabulations for 1870 to 1900 show, by counties, both the total 
population and the number of males twenty-one years old and over. A rough 
ratio of four-to-one exists between the total population of each county and its 
number of adult males. Specifically the percentages for Pike and Marion 
counties in 1890 are 26. 7 percent and 25 . 1  percent, respectively. Multiplying 
the total population of each township by these percentages produces a general 
idea of the size of the electorate in each township. Comparison of this estimate 
to the number of votes cast in the 1892 election shows the two figures are 
generally compatible. Comparing them both to the number of persons reporting 
personal property to the tax assessor in 1892 provides another check for 
accuracy. 3 Tables 22 and 23 detail this relationship. 
3. If the estimated adult male population is less than the number of votes 
cast in the township in 1892 like in Tonti Township i n  Marion County, or less than 
the number of persons reporting personal property very likely something is 
wrong with the estimate. This circumstance probably is an indication that the 
township contained an unusually large number of older people--perhaps the 
median age there was higher because of this--and hence .the percentage of adult 
males was higher than in the other townships. Of course, another possibility 
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TABLE 22 
ESTil\lATED ADULT MALE POPULA'DON FOR SELECTED 
.TOWNSHIPS OF MARION COUNTY, I LLlNOIS, FOR 1890 
Township 
C arrigan 
Haines 
Meacham 
Raccoon 
Tonti 
Source: 
Estimated 1892 1892 
Total Adult Votes Personal 
Population Males Cast Property 
774 194 166 146 
1003 251 217 233 
790 198 164 188 
1137 284 234 254 
954 225 229 215 
Assessors' Books for Carrigan, Haines, Meacham 
and Tonti townships for 1892, and for R accoon 
Township for 1891, and "Aggregate Population by 
Minor Civil Division, " Compendium of the Eleventh 
Census: 1890, Part I--Population , pp. 122, 124, 125, 
and Centralia Sentinel, November 24, 1892. 
Once the number of adult males in each township has been determined, 
. 
the degree of political involvement in the townships may be established. Earlier 
chapters have uncovered some strong, though few, relationships between 
agrarian conditions in the various townships and the amount of third party vote 
at the polls in 1892. In general, it has been fairly explicitly determined that 
areas where the Populists did well i n  the election were townships where an 
unfortunate combination of conditions made farmers so discontented that large 
numbers, either in protest or in despair, jumped in 1892 to a radical party 
offering radical solutions for their economic ills. However, no evidence 
is vote fraud--"stuffing" the ballot box, or an individual casting more than 
one vote. Similarly, a large discrepancy between the estimated adult males 
and the votes cast and/or personal property owners may indicate a relatively 
young township--younger farmers with l arge families. Such may be the case 
with. Hardin, Pearl, and Spring Creek townships in Pike County. 
TABLE 23 
·ESTIMATED ADULT MALE POPULATION FOR SELECTED 
.TOWNSHIPS OF PIKE COUNTY, I LLINOIS, FOH 1890 
Estimated 1892 1892 
Total Adult Votes Personal 
Township Population Males Cast Property 
Detroit 833 222 211 1 80 
Hardin 1051 280 217 183 
Martinsburg 1186 317 295 210 
Montezuma 1360 363 339 3 1 8  
Newburg 1060 283 256 201 
Pearl 1256 336 236 239 
Spring Creek 1590 424 331 308 
. . Source: Assessors' Books for DetroLt, Hardrn, Martinsburg, 
Newburg, Pearl, and Spring Creek townships for 
1892, and for Montezuma Township for 1891, and 
"Aggregate Population by Minor Civil Division, " 
Compendium of the Eleventh Census: 1890, Part I 
--l>opulation, pp. 122, 124, 125,  and Pike Co:.inty 
Democrat, November 1 6 ,  1892. 
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exists that agrarian discontent politicized the electorate, a� Table 24 
shows. 
While the electorate was extremely active in the election of 1892--as 
illustrated by the unusually high turnout, by modern standards at the polls--
no great groundswell mqvement developed in the hypersensitive Populist areas. 
Any expectation, either by the Populists or by the historians who have studied 
them, that deplorable conditions would stir the usually politically uninvolved 
i�to action in 1892 was unrealized, at least in Marion and Pike counties. 4 
4 .  No accurate method exists to measure the 1892 turnout against the 
1888 vote. Although absolute voting figures are available, of course, any 
attempt to compare the percent voting in 1892 with the 1888 figure would be 
highly speculative, at best. Even though the 1890 census is equidistant from 
the two elections, and even though the general direction of population trends in 
TABLE 24 
yOTES CJ\ST IN PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS OF 1888 Al\1D 
1892 IN SELECTED TOWNSHIPS OF MARION Al\1D PIKE 
COUNTIES, I LIJNOIS 
1888 1892 
l\Totes Cast Percent Voting* Votes Cast Percent Voting 
[Marion 
Carrigan 170 87. 7 ' 166 85. 4 
Haines 191 76. 2 217 86. 4 
Meacham 162 81. 8 . 164 82. 9  
Raccoon 218 77. 7 234 82. 3 
Tonti 190 84. 3  229 --
Pike : 
Detroit -- -- 211 95. 0 
Hardin 237 84. 7 217 77. 4 
Martinsburg 281 88. 7 295 93. 3 
Montcznma 331 9 1 .  2 339 93 . 3  
Newburcr t:> 2;60 91. 8 256 95. 5 
Pearl 279 83. 2 236 70. 3 
Spring Creek 308 72. 6 331 78. 2 
* See footnote 4 in this chapter, and also Tables 22 and 23 
116 
Change in 
Percent Voting 
- 2. 3 . ·. 
+10. 2 
+ 1 . 1  
+ 4 . 6 
--
--
- 7. 3 ' 
+ 4 .  6 
+ 2. 1 
+ 3 . 7  
-12. 9 
+ 5. 2 
All the townships in Marion County appear equally active and, indeed, in Pike 
County three of the Populist townships seemed relatively apathetic politically 
when compared to their other Populist and non-Populist neighbors. Both counties 
the various townships between 1880 and 1890 is known, it cannot be assumed the 
rate at which the population changed in each township was steady, or even that 
it maintained the same direction throughout the entire decade. Thus a 
comparison of degree of political participation in the 1888 and 1892 elections, 
using the 1890 population figures as the basis for calculating the percentage of 
the electorate voting in each case, is of questionable validity, except as a 
very, very rough estimate, with all the qualifications already mentioned. 
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were poor counties in the Eighties and Ninties. The high overall percentage 
of voters in all the townships well may reflect the generally depressed 
economic conditions in the area. But no relatively undistressed county has 
been studied to provide a standard against which to measure the validity of 
this theory. If the perception of a Populist threat in any of these townships 
aroused concern among Republicans and Democrats about the success of their 
political organizations--apparant in Marion County newspapers, but not in 
the Pike County press--thcy did not flock to the polls in those townships to 
prevent it. �ndeed, in Hardin, Pearl, and Spring Creek townships, Republicans 
and Democrats, and maybe even some potential Populists, actually seem to 
have stayed away from the polls. Thus if the residents of Marion and Pike 
counties, upset by economic conditions in 1892, were attracted by the presence 
of a third party proposing radical agrarian ideas, or if they were sickened and 
repulsed by such a party, they did not show their increased concern at the 
polls--at least not i n  most of the Populist townships. Thus, while the People's 
Party was strong in several townships of both counties, no evidence indicates 
that persons ordinarily inert politically went to the polls to stop the radical 
threat or, perhaps upset by conditions, to aid it. 
But regardless of whether or not agrarian discontent was reflected by 
increased voter turnout at township polling places, in general, population 
factors show no cause and effect relationship with third party strength in the 
townships studied. Some Populist townships grew between 1870 and 1880 
and 1890, others suffered varying degrees of population loss, some remained 
the same. Furthermore, non-Populist townships also exhibited these 
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same tendencies to roughly the same degrees. Even when population changes 
are considered in conjunction with the expansion or contraction of agriculture 
in the various townships, no clear cut characteristics emerge to define and 
separate the Populist areas from those where the third party did not run well . 
in the election. The size of the per capita land base providing financial support 
for each township's residents varied greatly throughout all townships, Populist 
and non-Populist. So did changes in that economic base over time. Indeed, 
i f  a common factor or characteristic can be found to explain the strength of 
third party politics in some townships of Marion and Pike counties in Illinois, 
it will not be a population characteristic. This chapter on population has 
proven the null hypothesis. 
CHAPTER VIII 
The People's Party in  Marion and Pike Counties: An Overview and Reassessment 
Voting behavior always is difficult to explain and analyze. The average . 
voter seldom really knows why he votes the way he does. He intuitively senses 
that he likes or dislikes particular candidates or parties, often because he 
supports or opposes the positions those candidates or parties take on issues 
·which he deems important. But he seldom considers, in a coldly analytical 
way, just how his environment shapes his own positions on those issues. Indeed, 
he generally does not realize the conditions which surround him both create 
the issues vital to him and determine their rank in his hierarchy of importance. 
Thus when the voter discusses his vote and reveals why he cast it, he is not 
explaining reasons, but only his reaction to them. 
The Pike or Marion County farmer who in 1892 might have explained his 
vote for the Populists by attacking the inability of the Harrison administration to 
alleviate the economic situation in his area was stating a manifestation, 'not a 
reason. He sensed the poor condition of agriculture, and its continuing economic 
decline, and reacted against it in support of a political party promising to improve 
his situation. But the conditions which might have created his economic situation-­
poor land, not enough land, low productivity, and low crop prices--actually 
explain his vote, not the situation itself. This is a very subtle point, but also 
an important one. Farmers in the Populist townships very likely rejected the 
119 
120 
moderate parties and embraced the radical one without being more than only 
very vaguely aware how the condition of agriculture and what they were doing 
about it differed from their neighbors' situation. 
Farm mechanization is the key to explaining Populism in Marion and 
Pike counties. Almost without exception, i n  both Marion and Pike, the townships 
supporting the Populists were highly mechanized, and those which gave no 
support to the third party were not. The extensive use of machinery in the 
Populist townships likely indicates a committment to scientific agriculture 
not found elsewhere in either county. Furthermore, it illustrates the attempts 
of some farmers to overcome the adversity imposed by topographic and 
( 
demographic conditions in their townships. Adoption of mechanized techniques 
was an effort to compensate for too m any people, or poor land, or not enough 
land, or for a combination of these circumstances. By using machinery to 
a greater extent than did their neighbors, farmers in the radical political 
areas hoped to increase the efficiency of operating farms which were too small 
or too infertile to be productive enough to provide a decent living. More 
efficiency meant lower production costs and hopefully a higher profit--or at 
least a profit of some kind. 
Repeated estimates have been made of the saving in human labor and money 
realized by adoption of agricultural machinery in the farming process. For 
example, wheat production; a good man with a sickle could reap, <hind, and 
shock over half an acre per day. With a cradle scythe he could reap three acres 
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per day, but to keep that pace his operation required three men to bind for 
every two cradlers. A mechanical reaper equalled four or five cradlers. 
A self-raking reaper saved four to five men in cutting a ten to twelve acre 
field. After his initial investment for the machine was recovered, the farmer 
began to save on the wages he otherwise would have paid hired hands. If 
his farm was too small to require a large labor force in the first place--as 
may well have been the case in some Populist townships of Pi:ke County--he 
still enjoyed the advantage of being able to sow, and' harvest a large number of 
acres than he and his family could have managed using only rudimentary farming 
methods. This was an important consideration for cereal crops such ·as were 
grown in Pike and Marion counties, especially at harvest time. The harvest 
for small gains generally lasts about ten days, during which time the grain 
is ripe enough to cut but not so ripe as to thresh out on . the ground during the 
cutting. For a small farmer this time limitation meant he could only plant 
. 
7 1/2 acres for each hand available at harvest time. But with a reaper he 
could plant 135 acres and harvest it himself, if he desired. 1 
The increased efficiency resulting from mechanization of agriculture in 
the years after the Civil War saved manpower and time, and therefore money. 
Fewer men could do the same job in less time. By using disc gang plows , 
broadcast seeders, five section harrows and self-raking reapers , the work of 
a man in a wheat field was eighteen times as effective as when the work was 
done by hand . .  In the case of cereal crops, the farmer realized a financial 
1 .  . Shannon, Farmers' Last Frontier, pp. 140-44. 
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savings ranging from 66 percent for corn to 80 percent for wheat over the 
costs of production using crude methods. This savings c.:>uld be implemented 
either by reducing t1:1 e payroll or by increasing the production of a fixed labor 
force. 2 Table 25 shows the savings in hours of l abor needed to produce one 
acre of the kinds of crops common to Marion and Pike counties. However, 
as well illustrated by the non-Populist townships of Marion and Pike counties, 
TABLE 25 
COMPARISON OF HOURS NEEDED TO PRODUCE AN ACRE 
OF SELECTED CROP3 BY HAND A!'U) BY MACHINE 
Hand Machine 
Crop Hours M:inutes Hours Minutes 
Wheat 61 5 . 0  3 19. 2 
Corn 38 4 5 . 0 15 7 . 8 
Oats - 66 15. 0 7 5. 8 
Hay: loose 21 5. 0 3 56. 5 
Hay: baled 35 30 . 0  11 34. 0 
Source: Fred A. Shannon, The Farmer's Last 
Frontier: Agriculture, 1860-1897, p. 143. 
many farmers in the 1890 's were relatively unmechanized. Partly because of 
the traditional conservatism of agricultural areas but also because of the 
expense involved, farmers continued to use highly inefficient production methods. 
However, that was a luxury farmers i n  some townships could not afford. 
In Marion County, farmers in Haine�, Meacham, and Raccoon townships 
f9µn.d their la�d tq be inferior to their neighbor's acreage. This difference is 
2. Shannon, Farmers' Last Frontier, p. 143. 
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reflected in the lower values assigned to it for tax purposes. To compensate 
for this disadvantage, and to provide a decent standard of living for their 
families , these farmers undertook a dual program to expand the acreage they 
had in production and to use machinery to farm their holdings more efficiently. 
Consequently, they eiq)8nded their improved acreage by between thirteen and 
twenty percent, well above their neighbors' expansion levels and, coupled with 
modern agricultural methods and a general population loss during the Eighties, 
increased their per capita economic base between three and five percent. 
Some similar trends existed in the two non-Populist townships, but with 
significant differences. Land in Carrigan and Tonti was more valuable than 
acreage in Haines, Meacham and Raccoon. By comparison conditions in those 
two townships were not marginal. In fact, Carrigan Township also experienced 
-
expansion in the Eighties. But with better land to start, and with no real 
financial committment to machinery, Carrigan farmers were in a much less 
precarious position. Of course they wanted to improve their condition, but 
failure to do so held consequences less grim than for the more marginal and 
heavily indebted farms committed to expansion i n  Haines, Meacham , and Raccoon. 
Tonti land was equal to Carrigan in value. But farmers there seemed more 
concerned about increasing their livestock herds during the Eighties than in 
putting more acres into production. So they too had no investment in machinery 
and implements to protect or recover. 
3 
3 .  The changes noted for Marion County reflect data contained in Tables 
5, 10, and 19, pages 71, 79, and 106, respectively. The figures in Table 10, 
showing a general and varied decline in the value of implements in each townships 
The situation in Pike County was strikingly similar. Persons in 
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Montezuma, Newburg, Pearl and Spring Creek townships were faced with 
a production problem much like the one afflicting Haines, Meacham, and 
Raccoon townships i n  Marion County. However the Pike County farmers' 
problem was not due to poor land in the same sense as in Marion, but 
rather to a l ack of land on which to expand. Farmers i n  these Pike County 
townships were working land as good as their neighbors '.  They just did not 
have enough of it. While the answer in Marion County had been a combination 
of expansion and mechanization to overcome soil infertility by increasing 
production, farmers in southeastern Pike had fewer alternatives. Placing 
new land in production just was not feasible in townships where that land 
was hilly, broken, and heavily timbered. In these Pike County townships 
mechanization was the only answer, unless the residents wished to maintain 
the status quo. Modern agricultural techniques promised to lower per acre 
production costs even if the farmers could not expand onto new acreage. 
4 
Farms in Detroit and Martinsburg, which did not support the People's 
Party in 1892, were considerably larger than those in the Populist townships. 
Their size, coupled with a significant population loss between 1870 and 1890 
are difficult to interpret because they include such vari ables and unknowns as 
age of machinery assessed--depreciation counted in figuring value--the number 
of repossessions in the Eighties, the number of people leaving the township 
and taking their machinery, the number and value of new machines purchased 
during the decade, and the types of machinery and implements found in the 
various townships. 
4. Pike County statistics relevant to this paragraph arc found in Tables 
13, 14, and 16, pages 93, 95, and 98, respectively. The inability of the river 
townships to increase production by expanding is  ilJustratcd by the fact that 
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mitigated the need to bring new land into production or to mechanize to 
increase production on acreage already planted. Indeed, similar developments 
i n  Newburg and Montezuma townships moderated the degree of mechanization 
there also. Both these areas had relatively flat good land which, except for 
population losses of 31 and 9 percent between 1870 and 1890, would have been 
developed. But with little pressure to open new land, and with large farms 
already, the need to mechanize was moderated. Even in Detroit Township, 
a population loss of 26 percent lessened the pressure for more efficient 
production. But Pearl and Spring Creek townships experienced increases 
of 100 percent and 58 percent, respectively, during those two decades. With 
no good new land available, people were forced to modernize production as 
the only alternative to create a better living standard. 
Thus, mechanization of agriculture is the key to explaining support for 
the People's Party in  Marion and Pike counties. The people in the Populist 
townships were attempting to shape their own destinies. They refused to 
surrender to the adverse economic conditions around them, and they had every 
reason to hope for a bright future. In Marion County residents of these townships 
were opening new lands to production in an attempt at self-improvement. In 
both counties, farmers in these townships were adopting new and improved 
methods of agriculture. Although these solutions required heavy financial 
investment and indebtedness , they created a revolution of rising expectations. 
between 1872 and 1892 the biggest jump in improved acres was a 3 .  2 percent 
increase i n  Detroit Township. 
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These poor farmers were taking a chance which their neighbors were too 
frightened or too conservative or too apathetic to take. They expected 
it to pay off; they expected a better return for their efforts in the future 
than they had been used to in the past. When agricultural prices continued 
to decline throughout" the Eighties, thus cancelling out the potential benefits 
of their efforts, farmers of these poor but struggling townships became 
increasingly frustrated. Their failure to improve their situation despi te 
concerted efforts must have been damaging psychologically as well as financially. 5 
The climax of this situation came in November 1892, and it took the form of 
a large protest vote in the polling places of these townships. 
The Populist movement provides fertile territory for social historians 
and for psycho-history. Farmers who readily accepted the agricultural rev-
olution following the Civil War developed a unique mind-set which ultimately 
found expression in the People's Party in 1892. Such persons were receptive 
to ideas and they were aggressive. By accepting the mechanization of agriculture 
they freed themselves from large amounts of spirit-deadening toil. They often 
devoted the increased leisure time which resulted to social and political activity, 
as first illustrated by the Granger movement. Thus their aggressiveness and 
6 
energy was tr:anslated into the political arena as early as the 1870's. A great 
5. The financial consequences of the agricultural collapse are noted for 
highly mechanized areas in Shannon, Farmers' Last Frontier, p. 146. 
6. Ibid. , p. 145, and Norman Pollack, The Populist Response to Industrial 
America, Midwestern Populist Thought (New York: W.W. Norton and Co. , Inc.) ,  
pp. 3 ,  4 .  
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debate has arisen in Populist historiography in recent years. Men like 
Norman Pollack and Charles McArthur nestler have challenged the traditional 
view of Populism first expounded by John Hicks in 1931 and generally accepted 
thereafter. Hicks considered the Populists to be utopian and reactionary. 
He saw the Populist farmework as basically retrogressive--an attempt to 
restore America to a simpler, more rural society. Pollack and nestler 
contend the movement was highly m aterialistic and pragmatic .  
7 
The evidence gleaned from this study of Illinois Populism at the township 
level tends to favor the Pollack-nestler point of view. Support for the People's 
Party in Marion and Pike counties came from areas receptive to adoption 
of modern farming methods, from areas where farmers seized the initiative 
and tried to improve their situation. In other townships, farmers continued 
with business as usual; they made little if any effort to change the condition of 
agriculture on their farms. In Marion, for example, residents of Carrigan 
and Tonti townships were content with their high land values and relatively 
rudimentary farming techniques. They were willing to maintain the status quo, 
and this desire was reflected in the 1892 election results from those townships. 
But residents of Haines, Meacham and Raccoon townships already had 
rejected the status quo, as had farmers in Montezuma, Newburg, Pearl and 
Spring Creek townships in Pike County. These people had already launched 
an aggressive and heavily financed effort to alter their economic situation. 
7. Hicks' interpretation is of course, The Populist Revolt; Pollack is 
cited above in footnote 6.  The other work mentioned is nestler "Consumation 
of a Labor-Populist Alliance, 1894 , "  and is fully cited in footnote 4, p. 49. 
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By investing in  farm machinery and, in Marion County at least, by expanding 
production, they confidently looked forward to better times. When those 
times did not arrive, frustration and discontent set it. When their efforts 
at self-help proved fruitless, and when their rising expectations were crushed, 
they began to pay attention to the assertions of radical intellectuals and 
politicians--assertions about distant forces controlling agriculture and about 
manipulation of the economy by financial, commercial, and industrial interests . 
They were not entirely unfamiliar with these cha:r:ges . The railroads and 
manufacturers had been targets of similar attacks in the Seventies and Eighties. 
Like their Grange predecessors, these farmers let their energy, aggressiveness, 
and pragmatism slip over into politics. Although many had already voted for 
third party movements in the Eighties, 8 declining conditions made even more 
farmers receptive to radical agrarian ideologies in the Ninties. In 1892, in 
a combination of frustration and hppe, farmers in these highly mechanized but 
struggling townships finally in large numbers declared their political independ­
ence from their neighbors. While the apathetic, conservative, unreceptive 
farmers of other townships continued in  traditional ways--unmechanized 
rudimentary farming and Republican or Democratic politics--residents of seven 
townships in Marion and Pike counties cast votes for People's Party candidates. 
Mechanization of agriculture is the key which ties these areas together in common. 
But like the farmer who tries to explain his vote in terms of party policy, 
mechanization_i_s. only the manifestation of a reason. The reason for the high 
8, See the Appendix for voting tables . 
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incidence of Populism in these townships was the condition of agriculture 
there, and the attitude of the residents to do something about it. 
APPENDIX 
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VOTE FOR PRESIDENT IN I LIJNOIS IN 1892 
Cleveland Harrison Bidwell Weaver 
Counties Democrat Republican Prohibition People's 
Adams 7, 746 6, 081 471 186 
Alexander 1 , 674 2, 053 1 9  61 
Bond 1 , 328 1 , 659 237 77 
Boone 518 1 , 994 137 52 
Brown 1 , 567 879 85 315 
Bureau 3, 555 3, 924 378 324 
Calhoun 840 563 29 146 
Carroll 1 , 444 2, 456 170 107 
Cass 2, 203 1 , 533 119 81 
Champaign 4, 502 5, 290 544 80 
Christian 3, 655 2, 941 316 419 
Clark 2, 244 2, 181 128 655 
Clay 1 ,  604 1 , 774 85 424 
Clinton 2 , 393 1, 361 , 57 114 
Coles 3 , 611 3, 693 203 97 
Cook 144, 604 111, 254 3, 858 1 ,  6J.4 
Crawford 1 , 875 1, 790 54 220 
Cumberland 1, 785 1, 470 106 209 
DeKalb - 1 ,  926 3, 789 489 36 
DeWitt 2, 083 2, 059 120 86 
Douglas 1, 999 2, 246 134 70 
DuPage 2, 154 2, 478 274 16 
Edgar 3 , 164 3, 197 155 195 
Edwards 677 1 , 350 74 56 
Effingham 2 , 744 1 , 472 125 130 
Fayette 2, 433 1, 980 152 836 
Ford 1 , 359 2, 227 207 20 
Franklin 1, 782 1, 631 75 198 
Fulton 5, 253 4, 948 242 379 
Gallatin 1 ,  675 1 , 211 69 203 
Greene 3, 146 1, 967 152 329 
Grundy 1 , 892 2, 159 201 44 
Hamilton 2 ,  061 1 , 505 58 157 
Hancock 4, 132 3, 393 292 303 
Hardin 700 660 12 159 
Henderson 921 1 , 352 117 27 
Henry 2 ,  670 4, 265 393 312 
Iroquois 3 , 848 3, 936 338 87 
Jackson 2, 858 3, 031 210 3 61 
Jasper 2 , 217 1, 519 163 296 
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Cleveland Harrison Bidwell Weaver 
Counties Democrat Republican Prohibition People's  
Jefferson 2, 332 1 , 949 147 806 
Jersey 2, 011 1 , 313 115 76 
JoDaviess 2, 793 2 , 680 138 129 
Johnson 854 1, 716 108 419 
Ka ne 5, 778 7 , 977 719 353 
Kankakee 2,  763 3 , 577 203 39 
Kendall 848 1 ,  619 277 28 
Knox 3, 073 5 , 800 384 331 
Lake 1 , 964 2 ,  932 202 31 
LaSalle 9, 395 7, 957 520 191 
Lawrence 1 , 572 1, 523 161 106 
Lee 2, 740 3 , 513 163 61 
Livingston 3, 960 3, 980 421 184 
Logan 3, 150 2, 619 300 87 
Macon 4, 303 4, 575 551 95 
Macoupin 5, 051 3 , 868 337 288 
Madison 5, 680 5, 355 280 354 
Marion 2, 709 2, 324 262 532 
Marshall 1, 834 1, 590 92 18 
Mason 2, 211 1 , 614 190 1 9  
Massac 799 1, 652 43 148 
McDonough 3, 237 3 , 31 9  304 243 
McHenry ?, 311 3 , 205 263 31 
McLean 6, 487 7 , 445 769 63 
Menard 1, 748 1, 278 133 115 
Mercer 1 , 975 2 , 470 135 107 
Monroe 1 , 611 1 , 153 7 108 
Montgomery 3, 707 2, 935 344 171 
Morgan 4 , 006 3 , 471 275 195 
Moultrie 1, 670 1 , 287 65 264 
Ogle 2 , 244 3 ,  939 283 33 
Peoria 8, 053 7 , 266 284 321 
Perry 1 , 980 1 , 840 156 193 
Piatt 1 , 896 2, 138 129 23 
Pike 3, 494 2 , 751 225 1, 043 
Pope 816 1 , 629 16 324 
Pulaski 897 1, 662 30 40 
Putnam 514 561 55 14 
Randolph 2, 702 2 , 425 221 180 
Richland 1 , 542 1, 500 121 297 
Rock Island 4, 034 5, 052 340 219 
Saline 1 , 828 2, 171 59 293 
Sangamon 7 , 665 6, 009 779 181 
Schuyler 1 ,  880 . 1 , 563 149 209 
Counties 
Scott 
Shelby 
Stark 
St. Clair 
Stephenson 
Tazewell 
Union 
Vermilion 
Wabash 
Warren 
Washington 
Wayne 
White 
Whiteside 
Will 
Williamson 
Winnebago 
Woodford 
Totals . . . 
Cleveland 
Democrat 
. . . . 
1 , 282 
3 , 523 
824 
7 ,  207 
3, 717 
3, 653 
2, 663 
5, 001 
1, 428 
2, 294 
1, 868 
2 , 372 
2, 954 
2, 779 
6, 434 
2 , 118 
2, 634 
2 , 601 
426, 281 
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Harrison Bidwell Weaver 
Republican Prohibition People's  
1 , 006 30 214 
2 , 304 397 876 
1 , 240 133 246 
6, 276 195 356 
3, 574 282 70 
3, 030 147 115 
1, 427 65 47 
6 , 892 365 174 
1, 112 149 44 
2, 725 304 53 
1 , 956 162 145 
2 , 350 90 559 
2, 215 101 213 
3, 81 9  379 95 
6, 720 307 113 
2, 504 60 196 
5, 854 684 194 
1 738 226 63 
399, 288 25, 871 22, 207 
Source: Official Vote of the State of Illinois Cast at the General Election Held 
November 8, 1892 (Springfield, Ill. : H. W. Rokker,  State Printer 
and Binder, 1893), pp. 3, 4. 
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PRESIDENTIAL VOTE IN MARION COUNTY, ILLINOIS, 1888 AND 1892 
1888 1892 
Township R D 0 R D 0 
Centralia 1 281 143 11 217 107 10 
2 192 117  10 186 124 13 
3 244 143 29 229 170 27 
4 x x x 128 89 7 
5 x x x x x x 
CentraJ City 67 91 2 49 1 13 20 
Walnut Hill x x x 41 29 20 
Alma 61 111 19 79  129 25 
Carrigan 76 85 9 76  73 17  
Foster 54 118 4 69 108 14 . 
Haines 60 117 14 57 · 106 54 
Kinmundy 116 175 57  133 191 67 
Meacham 32 77 50 32 . 70 62 
Iuka 102 125 16  131 140 17 
Odin 124 139 1 5  143 169 1 8  
Sandoval 110 123 45 123 114 41 
Omega 62 91 56 64 114 53 
Patoka 75. 94 8 92 97 23 
Vernon 53 75 3 60 82 10 
Raccoon 101 88 29 -.70 48 116 
Romine 82 94 32 78 . 103 34 
Salem 1 54 87 54 93 124 36 
2 112 191 4 5  71  162 43 
Stevenson 43 90 29 41 104 47 
Tonti 64 121 5 66 143 20 
Source: Centralia Sentinel, November 22, 1888 and November 24, 1892 
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PRESIDENTIAL VOTE IN PIKE COUNTY, ILLlNOIS, 1888 AND 1892 
1888 1892 
Township R D 0 R D 0 
Atlas 253 1-59 1 6  217 202 24 
Barry 287 329 31 289 312 48 
Chambersburg 37 101 19 55 99 17 
Cincinnati 10 43 0 22 73 9 
Derry 81 185 7 85 190 18 
Detroit 64 118 215 ? 74 105 32 
Fairmount 99 120 3 112 113 10 
Flint 40 50 6 27 . 57 1 5  
Griggsville 258 240 340 ? 228 230 162 
Hadley 125 99 2 1  109 100 36 
Hardin 66 99 72 58 65 94 
Kinderhook 134 203 27 147 228 33 
Levee 24 42 1 30 72 2 
Martinsburg 115 117 49 129 111 55 
Montezuma 95 106 130 90 100 149 
Newburg 146 85 29 95 60 101 
New Salem 123 231 33 123 232 46 
Pearl 53 118 108 31 71 120 
Perry 195 196 1 5  183 186 41 
Pittsfield 290 406 88 304 415 53 
Pleasant Hill 71 180 61 87 160 68 
Pleasant Vale 135 185 2 136 167 39 . 
Ross 37 22 5 23 16 20 
Spring Creek 82 158 68 90 125 116 
Source: Pike County Democrat, November 15, 1888 and November 16,  1892 
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AN EXPLANATION OF YULE'S Q 
Yule's Q is a means to statistically express the degree of association 
between two dichotomous variables. Literally, it measures the amount that 
one characteristic or variable i nfluences the presence or absence of a second 
characteristic or variable in a population of entities being studied. Q ·ranges 
from values of +1. 000 to - 1 .  000. In the first case, the figure shows perfect 
positive association, that the presence of one characteristic is related to the 
presence of a second characteristic. When Q i� at its negative maximum of 
- 1 .  000, it means the presence of the first characteristic is related to the 
absence of the second characteristic. The decimal figures ranging between 
these two boundarie s show the degree to which a positive or a negative association 
between the two variables exists. In this study, the two variables for which 
Yule's Q was employed were population gain or loss and voting behavior; the 
subjects were the several townships. In this particular case Q was zero, an 
indication of no cause and effect relationship or association between the two 
factors. 
A fourfold table such as the one shown on page 108 is used to compute 
Yule's Q.  All subjects exhibiting both characteristics (at pre-determined 
. levels) are tallied in quadrant "a", in  the upper left corner of the table. Those 
showing the first characteristic but not the second are placed· in quadrant ' 'b" 
in the upper right corner. The subjects possessing the second characteristic, 
but not the first one, are put i n  section "c", in the lower left quarter, and 
those subjects possessing neither variable are placed in 11d11 cell, in the lower 
right corner on the table. The following diagram shows this placement. 
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a b 
c d 
By comparing the diagonal cells, one can observe the degree to which 
possession of one ch.aracteristic influences the presence or absence of the 
second variable.. The formula Q=(ad-bc)/(ad+bc) is used to mathematically 
make this comparison. If Q works out to be above a pre-determined absolute 
value, usually around 0. 750 to 0 .  800, a strong association between the two 
variables, be it positive or negative, is said to exist. 
Another example of Yule's Q, in  addition to the one in  Chapter VII, might 
be as follows: Suppose a comparison was being made between Populist voting 
. in 1892 and the raising of wheat in the subject townships. Let's say that of 
eleven townships, six. had significant wheat crops and five d.id not. Fu:rtther 
suppose five of the six areas growing wheat were Populist townships and that 
three of the ones growing little wheat were non-Populist in 1892. Using P and 
NP to signify voting behavior and W and NW for "wheat" and "no wheat" the 
fourfold table would look like this: p 
w 5 1 
NW 2 3 
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Substituting the figures from the table's four cells into the formula produces a 
value of +O. 765. Thus, on the basis of Yule1s Q one could state a fairly strong 
relationship exists in this sample case between planting wheat and voting the 
Populist ticket in 1892. Of course, interpretation of this relationship would 
depend on the historian's traditional method and insight. Quantitative measures 
like Yule's Q are meant only to assist in interpretation, not to replace it. 
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AN EXPLANATION OF SPEARMAN1S COEFFICIENT OF CORRELATION 
The Spearman Coefficient of Correlation, abbreviated rs' is  a measure 
of association between t\vo ranked variables. Like Yule's Q its value ranges 
between +1. 000 for perfect positive association to -1 . 000 for perfect negative 
or inverse association. Also like Yule's Q, Spearman values at or near zero 
signify no relationship at all between the two variables. 
However, Spearman's Coefficient is a much more sophisticated and 
sensitive measure than is Q. While Q measures only unranked dichotomous 
variables, r considers the relative degrees to which the subjects possess s 
those characteristics, and ranks the subjects accordingly. In fact, the coefficient 
is  calculated from the difference in the rankings of each subject on each of the 
two variables. The formula is r =1-[6( D2 /N(N2-1)J , where ( D is  the sum of 
s 
differences in each subject's rankings for each characteristic, and N is  the total 
number of subjects. 
The example of wheat production and Populism,, used in the explanation 
of Yule's Q serves not only to illustrate the application of Spearman's Coefficient, 
but also to distinguish it from Q. Ranking each township according to the per-
centage of Populist votes cast in 1892, with the township carried most decisively 
by the People's Party placed first, produces rankings from 1 to 11; the lowest 
rank is  assigned the township where the Populists did worst as a percentage of 
the total vote cast. Then ranking those same townships according to wheat 
production, the highest producer ranked first, creates the followl.ng situation 
b ased on this mythical data. 
TOWNSHIP POPUUSM WHEAT D D 2 
A 1 1 1  10 100 
B 2 10 8 64 
c 3 6 3 9 
D 4 5 1 1 
E 5 4 1 1 
F' 6 3 3 9 
G 7 2 5 25 
H 8 7 1 1 
I 9 9 0 0 
J 10 10 0 0 
K 1 1  1 10 100 
N=ll ( D2=309 
Placing figures into the formula produces a value for r of +-0 .  407, not a 
s 
1 3 9  
strong correlation. Careful examination of these rankings will determine 
that the frequency of the two variables in the fourfold table of the Yule's Q 
example _has be�n maintained in the computation of r 8; five of the seven Populist 
townships (A to G) were among the top six wheat producers (from "a" cell of 
the fourfold table), and three of the non-Populist townships (H to K) were low 
wheat producers (from "d" cell of the fourfold table}.. Why then does the Q 
measurement indicate a strong relationship between the production of wheat and 
Populism, while the Spearman measure shows no relationship between the same 
two variables. The answer is found in the fact that Q does not discriminate 
between different degrees in a variable which may exi.st between townships 
occupying the same cell of a fourfold table. The Spearman Coefficient, on the 
other hand, ranks the t-oiimships by each variable and thus is a more sophisti-
cated measure, although slightly more trouble to compute, than is Yule's Q. 
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